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Abstract 
Motivational factors thought to differentially influence the use of majority size as a 
criterion for conformity were investigated, along with the particular manner in which 
majority size is used. Specifically, performance goals and individuals’ uncertainty about 
their own judgment were hypothesized to increase the need for valid social information, 
thereby leading to greater scrutiny of the source itself. In two studies, participants 
performed a mental rotation task and viewed piecharts representing the ostensible 
normative judgments of their peers. The apparent competence of the majority was 
manipulated by associating large majorities with either correct or incorrect judgments, 
which would have taken multiple trials to detect. I predicted that only with a performance 
goal (as opposed to an affiliation goal or a learning goal) would participants be motivated 
to track the validity of the information, and thus show differential conformity to 
apparently incompetent and competent majorities. In a third study, participants’ certainty 
in their own judgment was manipulated. I predicted that uncertain participants would be 
more persuaded by a large than small majority, which would contradict previous research 
findings showing only a majority status effect. None of the hypotheses were 
straightforwardly supported. However, additional analyses including participants’ 
perceptions of their own performance provided mixed support.  
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Introduction 
The purpose of this research is to examine some of the cues used by individuals 
when assessing the validity of a majority, how they use those cues in decisions to 
conform, and what motivational conditions are necessary for such a validation process to 
occur. Of particular interest in this thesis is majority size. Previous research suggests that 
on single shot presentations of social consensus information, majority size makes no 
difference in terms of persuasion (Gardikiotis, Martin, and Hewstone, 2005; Mackie, 
1987; Martin, Gardikiotis, and Hewstone, 2002)–that is, people are more likely to 
conform to or be persuaded by a majority regardless of how proportionally large it is. 
However, a pilot study conducted at Lehigh University suggested that people might use 
majority size to track the validity of a social majority over time, implying that majority 
size can act as a cue and influence conformity. The research presented here was designed 
as a follow-up to both lines of research. Motivational factors such as performance goals 
and states of uncertainty are proposed as factors that increase the importance of assessing 
the validity of social information, and therefore the use of majority size as a validity cue.   
 Conformity to the opinions and actions of peers is both a common and arguably 
necessary aspect of psychological functioning. From a young age, children use adults and 
peers as guides for learning (Allen, 2012). By adulthood, most people have lived in social 
environments that generally warrant trust in the competence of their peers, and so 
conformity with the actions and judgments of others becomes heuristically useful as a 
tool for competently interacting with the environment, both social and otherwise 
(Campbell, 1990; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). No wonder, then, that even when trust in a 
consensus appears to be entirely unwarranted from an observer’s perspective (such as 
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when groups of peers express obviously wrong perceptual judgments, as with Asch, 
1951), some individuals still conform to it (Wolosin, Sherman, & Cann, 1975). However, 
conformity is not simply a blind transmission of the norms of a group or prestigious 
individual to a hapless receiver.  Instead, it is a motivated process that at least sometimes 
involves more careful selection of social information for use in judgment and ongoing 
interaction.  
Social influence researchers have long recognized that conformity to social norms 
is motivated by individuals’ temporary and long-term needs and is regulated by goals 
(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Even 
young children discriminate between adults as reliable and unreliable as sources of 
guidance and information (e.g., Einav & Robinson, 2011; Harris & Corriveau, 2011; 
Koenig, Clément, & Harris, 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005). They also discriminate 
between what is relevant and irrelevant when selecting what actions to imitate, which 
depends on the underlying motivation for imitating (Allen, 2012). Most research studying 
adults has focused on conformity that is motivated by a need for accurate information 
about the world or a need for approval by peers. Conformity in the former case requires 
that the attitudes and actions of peers be accepted as a valid source of information (that is, 
peers exercise informational influence), but this is not so in the latter case—approval only 
requires compliance to norms (normative influence, Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).  
While peer approval may act as a superordinate goal regulating conformity in 
some circumstances, an individual must first value membership in a group for that group 
to exercise any kind of normative influence over his or her actions (e.g., Johnston & 
White, 2003; Terry & Hogg, 1996; Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999). Furthermore, even 
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when the individual values group membership, the integrity of the group itself may be 
superordinate to compliance with the group’s norms in terms of the individual’s 
regulatory priorities (Packer, 2008). The normative conflict model predicts that 
conformity to and dissent from a group’s norms depends critically on the individual’s 
identification with that group and the extent to which the norms of that group conflict 
with the individual’s goals and values (Packer, 2008). Identification is the extent to which 
an individual values a group into which they self-categorize (Packer, 2008; Tajfel, 1981). 
Low identifiers, when they conform at all, do so only when conflict is low and something 
is to be gained by doing so; high conflict will lead the low identifier to dissociate from 
the group. On the other hand, high identifiers will gladly conform to social norms under 
low conflict conditions, but they will seek to change norms seen as problematic for the 
integrity of the group if change seems possible. Thus, concerns over the validity of a 
social norm can be present and capable of inspiring non-conformity even among those 
who are normally amicable to the normative influence of their peers. For instance, Packer 
and Chasteen (Study 1, 2010) had participants indicate several groups with whom they 
strongly and weakly identified, how often they disagreed with the groups, and whether 
they disagreed for personal reasons or for reasons pertinent to the good of the groups. 
Results showed that participants not only disagreed more in groups with which they 
identify more, but they did so for collective reasons more so than for personal reasons, 
whereas in groups with which they identified less, they disagreed more for personal 
reasons. The remaining three studies showed that highly identified individuals will be 
more willing to dissent from a group norm if they perceive it to be harmful to the group, 
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but not if they perceive it to be personally harmful. These studies clearly demonstrate that 
motivational factors underlie the dynamics of conformity (and dissent).  
So far I have argued that individuals with a high need for accurate information 
and individuals with a high need for the approval of their group may still resist 
conformity if they evaluate the group or its norms as being invalid. However, an as yet 
unexamined assumption lies within this argument that individuals do in fact exercise the 
kind of scrutiny of norms that would enable them resist conformity. Although the 
conformity literature has not examined conformity as a function of systematic 
examination of social norms per se, a robust literature examining persuasion as a 
function of systematic examination of persuasive messages does exist (for a review, see 
Petty, Brinol, & Priester, 2009 and Chaiken & Ledgerwood, 2012). If conformity can be 
considered at least partially analogous to persuasion (both are certainly within the realm 
of social influence), then some of the same factors involved in persuasion should be 
evident in conformity.  
An overarching thesis in the persuasion literature is that persuasion results from 
an interaction between the validity of a persuasive message and the extent to which an 
individual engages with the message (Petty, Brinol, & Priester, 2009 and Chaiken & 
Ledgerwood, 2012). People who engage less with a message will tend to be persuaded by 
heuristics and peripheral cues. On the other hand, people who engage more with a 
message will be persuaded by arguments that are more central to it. Crucially, the level of 
engagement with a message depends on the individual’s motivation. Thus, a message 
more pertinent to the interests and goals of the individual will be engaged with more 
systematically, and if the arguments are perceived as valid, then the message will be more 
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persuasive. Could it be that conformity follows a similar pattern with respect to group 
norms?  
I propose that in the case of conformity, the “message” being scrutinized for 
validity is the group itself, especially when the group is being considered as a potential 
source of information. While people may employ a “consensus is correctness” rule in 
general, an enhanced need for valid information may increase the standard by which a 
consensus is viewed as useful. Consistent with the predictions of the elaboration 
likelihood model (Petty, Brinol, & Priester, 2009), the criteria for conformity to social 
information may fall along a continuum of increasing levels of scrutiny, where majorities 
are preferred to minorities when the need for valid social information is relatively low, 
large majorities are preferred to small majorities when the need is higher, and large 
majorities with a record of high performance over time are preferred when the need is at 
its highest. The first two levels are heuristic in nature, where a simple rule is applied, and 
the rule becomes more stringent as the need for valid information increases. The third is 
more effortful and requires the individuals to compare their own judgment to that of the 
group. During instances when individuals are confident in their own judgment, they can 
use the size of majorities agreeing with their position in order to gauge the validity of the 
majority. Thus, after several instances encountering consensus information about a group, 
they should develop sense of the validity of the majority as a source of information. If 
individuals have a higher need for valid information, and have been tracking the 
performance of a majority over time, then when they are uncertain about their own 
judgment, they should be more likely to conform to the majority if they view the majority 
as a valid source of information.  
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A pilot study conducted at Lehigh University demonstrated that the more effortful 
form of scrutiny involving the tracking of group performance over time does indeed 
occur. In that study, participants performed multiple trials of a mental rotation task 
(Shepard & Metzler, 1971), and social information was provided in the form of a piechart 
representing the ostensible percentage of students who thought that the stimuli were the 
same or different. Participants viewed piecharts from a majority that was either 
competent or incompetent, which could only be detected by noting the relative sizes of 
majorities giving correct and incorrect answers trial by trial. In the competent majority 
condition, large majorities were always correct and small majorities were always 
incorrect. In the incompetent majority condition, this relationship was flipped—large 
majorities were always incorrect and small majorities were always correct. The task was 
simple enough that participants should have been able to compare their own judgment to 
that of the majority represented by the piecharts when they were confident in their own 
judgment. Conformity, then, would result when participants were uncertain about the 
correct answer, but only if the majority was determined to be a valid source of 
information. Results supported this conjecture; participants conformed more to a 
competent than incompetent majority. This result differs from previous studies in the 
persuasion literature that show no effect of majority size (Gardikiotis, Martin, and 
Hewstone, 2005; Mackie, 1987; Martin, Gardikiotis, and Hewstone, 2002). However, 
those studies utilized a one-shot paradigm, where participants were not able to track the 
validity of the majorities over time. Furthermore, participants’ level of uncertainty was 
neither measured nor manipulated in those experiments.  
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The studies I will describe below were designed to examine motivational factors 
that influence the degree to which people use majority size as a cue to validity. Although 
the aforementioned pilot study showed conformity to a competent majority generally, 
perhaps participants in that study were motivated by a goal to perform well on the task, 
rather than, for instance, to affiliate with the group represented by the piecharts. The first 
two studies will manipulate goals and measure performance on a mental rotation task 
where the competence of the majority is manipulated systematically by correlating 
majority size with performance in a similar manner as in the pilot study described above. 
I hypothesized that only when pursuing a performance goal (as opposed to an affiliation 
or learning goal) will conformity differ between competent and incompetent majority 
conditions. The third study will manipulate participants’ sense of certainty about their 
own judgment, which is hypothesized to increase the need for valid information from a 
social majority. I anticipated that a large majority would be more persuasive than a small 
majority when people were made to feel uncertain and thus more reliant on social 
information. If successful, these studies would demonstrate that the use of majority size 
as a cue to validity, whether in a dynamic context or in a one-shot context, requires 
specific types of motivation (i.e., performance goals, states of uncertainty).  
In the pages that follow, I will review some of the literature on conformity to 
social norms and majorities. I will begin by reviewing some of the early history of 
conformity research and theory that led ultimately to the Asch (1951) paradigm, which 
has been a fundamental tool for studying conformity since that time. Next, I will discuss 
the research examining the effects of group and majority size on conformity behavior, 
including the results of two pilot studies conducted at Lehigh University. Following that 
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discussion, I will examine some of the motivational factors that have been explored in the 
conformity literature, especially as they pertain to the influence of groups both large and 
small. Lastly, I will describe and discuss the results of three studies I conducted at Lehigh 
University. 
Conformity and the Asch Paradigm 
 A central assumption of this thesis is that the act of conformity is, generally, 
reasonable, that individuals use conformity as a tool to navigate both social and non-
social environments, and that they conform because it is usually warranted to do so. Asch 
(1948, 1952) argued that social influence is a productive aspect of human functioning, 
and that it is so because people can generally rely on each other as an adequate source of 
information. He argued for what Campbell (1990) called a moral epistemology, where 
individuals have a moral responsibility to their peers to be truthful about their perceptions 
so that the group can function more competently. Indeed, as Boyd, Richerson, and 
Henrich (2011) argue, humans exist within a cultural niche, and without the ability to 
learn from others, humans cannot resolve the many adaptive problems posed by the 
sometimes rather extreme environments they inhabit. If social influence were functional 
only in an informational sense, then it should only occur when individuals have reason to 
doubt that they have all the information, and it should not occur when they do not. 
However, the results of Asch’s own research suggest that this is not always so. 
Asch was disappointed to discover that even on straightforward perceptual 
judgments (matching the lengths of lines) some people will betray their senses and 
conform to a clearly erroneous group of peers (Asch, 1951). His disappointment, argues 
Campbell (1990) and Hodges and Geyer (2006), was perhaps shortsighted, as the well-
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being of groups is not only dependent on the accuracy of their judgments, but also the 
relations between individuals in the group. Groups need accurate information from group 
members, but they also need compliance to norms in order to function. To paraphrase 
Campbell (1990), it is true that a groups need to act competently, but they cannot begin to 
act without agreeing on what to do.  
Before Asch, research on conformity was primarily situated within the prestige 
suggestion framework, which can be traced back to the work of hypnotists in the late 
nineteenth century who discovered that even non-hypnotized persons were susceptible to 
suggestion, and to the writings of sociologist Gabriel Tarde, who claimed that almost all 
social relations were acts of imitation and that the social person is no different from a 
hypnotized person (1903). Early theories of social influence attributed conformity to 
suggestibility, a willingness to believe or carry out the statements and commands of 
others (for a review, see Asch, 1948, 1952). Majorities were thought to possess prestige, 
a quality which afforded its bearer the ability to influence the beliefs, desires, and actions 
of others (Tarde, 1903). Later behaviorist researchers, such as Thorndike, considered 
prestige to be a kind of reinforcer, where agreement or disagreement with prestigious 
others was rewarding or punishing respectively (Thorndike, 1935). Taken together, the 
phenomenon of prestige suggestion was thought to account for conformity, and it was 
within that framework that the experimental paradigm examining conformity was 
developed.  
 At its most general, the experimental paradigm in conformity research has 
remained more or less the same since Moore’s (1921) study, where participants made a 
series of linguistic, ethical, and musical judgments repeatedly over the course of several 
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experimental sessions. The first two sessions acted as control conditions, where changes 
in ratings were recorded as a baseline. The next several sessions occurred two months 
later. Before the fourth session, the experimenter informed the participants what the 
majority opinion had been for the third session. Before the fifth session, the experimenter 
told participants of the ostensible opinion of an expert (in each category). Conformity 
was indexed as reversals of ratings between critical sessions compared to reversals 
between the first two sessions (that is, by chance). Relative to the control sessions, 
reversals occurred at a dramatically higher rate during both critical sessions. The general 
paradigm utilized by Moore, where participants recorded their judgments, viewed an 
ostensible (or real) majority or expert opinion, and then recorded their judgments again, 
became fairly standard for researchers investigating prestige suggestion (e.g., Lorge & 
Curtiss, 1936; Marple, 1933; Sherif, 1935; Asch, 1940). 
 Despite the predominance of the prestige suggestion framework, some researchers 
began to look to more cognitive explanations. Sherif (1935), for instance, argued that 
prestige was not a force acting on the individual from outside, but a kind of cognitive 
bias. To illustrate this point, he had a group of participants rank a set of authors by 
preference. A month later, they returned to the lab and rated a series of quotations by 
preference. Each quotation was accompanied by a name from the first list; however, the 
quotations were, in reality, all from authors not on the original list, and the passages were 
all of indistinguishable quality. The correlation between the two lists was fairly high 
among participants who reported making no special effort to avoid bias in favor of the 
author names, but no correlation was obtained for those who did report trying to avoid 
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bias. Sherif concluded that participants’ preferences created a bias (an avoidable one) in 
favor of quotes associated with their favorite authors.  
 Asch (1940) also took a cognitive approach to conformity, attempting to 
demonstrate that people use what they know about a judgment stimulus to first make 
sense of a potentially contradictory majority opinion, and then to reassess the stimulus 
based on a changed understanding of it. He referred to this process as a cognitive 
restructuring of the stimulus. Asch's participants ranked a set of ten professions, 
including politics, in order of intelligence, social usefulness, and other qualities. 
Experimental participants were also presented with an example ranking which ostensibly 
represented the average ranking for “politician” of 500 fellow students. Both control 
participants and participants who viewed a peer ranking that was low (10) rated 
politicians around 9 or 10 on average. However, those who viewed a peer ranking that 
was high (1) rated politicians around 4 or 5 on average. So far, this experiment 
conceptually replicates the findings from other studies using the Moore (1921) paradigm. 
However, following the rankings, participants were asked to write what they were 
thinking about when they ranked politicians. Among those who viewed high peer 
rankings, thoughts about politicians like Roosevelt and Lincoln were evoked, along with 
national politics (then held to higher esteem than it is today).  In contrast, among controls 
and participants who viewed low peer rankings, thoughts about disreputable politicians 
and shady local politics was most commonly evoked. Apparently, viewing the high 
rankings resulted in a more elaborate
1
 assessment of what it was that constituted the 
category of “politician”. Asch took these results to suggest that social influence is the 
interactive consequence of individuals’ understanding of their social environment and an 
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understanding that other people constitute a reliable source of information about the 
world.  
Asch’s later studies involved objective perceptual judgments (1951, 1952, 1955). 
He argued that previous research always created ambiguous, subjective situations, and it 
was this that made social influence possible (Asch, 1940, 1948). He hypothesized that if 
the judgment stimulus and the situation were perfectly clear to participants, that if the 
experimental situation involved no ambiguity or elements that could be reinterpreted, 
social influence would be dramatically reduced if not eliminated. Thus, rather than 
subjective judgments and opinions, Asch utilized a line matching task, where participants 
indicated which of three lines on a card matched a single line on another card in length. 
Furthermore, rather than being told about the judgment of an expert or a majority, single 
participants performed the experiment with 7 to 9 confederates who declared their 
answers out loud (participants were led to believe that the confederates were actually 
fellow participants). On seven out of nine trials, the confederates (who answer before the 
participant) unanimously give the same wrong answer. Whereas control conditions 
(confederates not present) showed almost no errors at all, among participants in the 
experimental condition (confederates present) 30% of all critical trials (confederates 
unanimously incorrect) had errors. These critical errors were not spread evenly among 
participants. Around 70% of the errors were made by participants who erred only once or 
twice, and around 25% of participants never conformed at all, suggesting that most 
participants did not conform most of the time—however, there were a handful of 
participants who conformed quite often.  
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 Although Asch interpreted the results of the study as indicative of a general 
independence from influence, many researchers who followed considered the results to 
be evidence of the opposite—that conformity is common, if not ubiquitous (for a review, 
see Friend, Rafferty, & Bramel, 1990). The discrepancy between these different 
interpretations can best be understood in the context of the research to which Asch was 
responding as opposed to the research agenda of those who followed. The prestige 
suggestion studies were quite successful, and showed fairly dramatic evidence of 
conformity, and the predominant theoretical assumption of the time was that conformity 
was the norm, that social interaction was simply a matter of imitation and suggestion. 
Asch’s study clearly demonstrated that individuals can and will exercise independence 
from influence, that social life is not necessarily dominated by conformity (Friend, 
Rafferty, & Bramel, 1990). However, the startling result of his study, which has been 
repeated time and again over the decades and across the world (for a review, see Bond & 
Smith, 1996), cannot be denied. The paradigm has proven to be extremely useful in 
examining in greater detail the variables involved in increased or decreased conformity, 
including motivational factors and cues to the validity of groups, such as the size of a 
group or a consensus.  
Motivation to Conform 
A variety of motivational circumstances have been shown to increase the need for 
valid information, and thus the informational influence of a group. When a task is 
difficult or an individual doubts his or her ability to make sound judgments, informational 
influence increases (Hochbaum, 1954; Coleman et al., 1958; Crutchfield, 1955). 
Moscovici and Lage (1978) showed that as the need for accuracy increases, majority 
 15 
influence becomes more prominent, whereas minority influence is more useful in 
developing innovative solutions to problems (also see Nemeth, 1986). Baron, Vandello, 
and Brunsman (1996) demonstrated that when incentives for accuracy are high, the 
influence of a majority is low on an easy task relative to a difficult task, on which 
influence is greater.  
Asch’s view on conformity is now regarded as overly narrow, as individual and 
group functionality depend on the satisfaction of more than the unbiased expression of 
individuals’ judgment, but also on the ability for group members to coordinate activity in 
order to pursue and satisfy group goals (Campbell, 1991). Deutsch and Gerard (1955) 
argue that more difficult tasks can increase normative influence (in addition to 
informational influence), as cooperative behavior can be instrumental for accomplishing 
difficult tasks, requiring group cohesion. They argued further that within a group context, 
individuals become sensitive to the possibility of sanction by the group, and thus they use 
conformity as a means to maintain positive relations with peers. Normative influence 
arises, then, as a consequence of the need for social approval. Cialdini and Trost (1998) 
framed normative influence similarly as resulting from the goal to build and maintain 
social relationships. Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson (1993) argue that individuals adopt 
the postures, vocal expressions, and other characteristics of people they value in order to 
enhance a connection with them. Arguably, the more similar people are, the more easily 
they can coordinate action with each other, and by engaging in normative behavior, 
individuals signal to others in the group that they are willing and able to cooperate 
efficaciously in the group setting (Hodges & Geyer, 2006; Campbell, 1991). Not only 
does normative influence serve the needs of individuals within the group context, as well 
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as the needs of the group itself, but it also serves the goal of maintaining a positive self-
image, as group norms provide the criteria for what it is that constitutes the right kind of 
behavior (Cialdini & Trost, 1998).  
Group Size 
Some of the earliest research to examine the effect of group size on conformity 
was reported by Asch in 1951 and 1955. In one condition, the “group” was just one 
partner, which resulted in little to no influence at all. Participants were not even disturbed 
by the disagreement, as they had been with a larger group. With two partners, conformity 
increased dramatically from 0% to 13%, and with three partners, conformity increased to 
around 31%. More than three partners made little to no difference. This pattern of 
influence, where one partner makes little difference, a second and third partner make a 
much larger difference, and four or more make little more difference than three has been 
noted throughout the social influence literature, and was modeled by Tanford and 
Penrod’s (1984) social influence model (SIM). The SIM models a range of social 
influence phenomena including majority and minority influence as well as deviate 
rejection. Campbell and Fairey (1989) argue that SIM is most appropriate as a model of 
informational influence. As a source of information, a single partner’s judgment may be 
viewed as idiosyncratic. With two or three people, idiosyncrasy becomes less likely, and 
the probability of its correctness increases, leading to much stronger informational 
influence of that group on the individual. The same argument can be made for minority 
influence, but the minority must also be consistent in their position. Moscovici and Lage 
(1976) found that a minority of two or more could be influential as long as they remained 
consistent in their position.  
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A second pattern of conformity, where the greatest influence is produced by a 
single partner and each additional partner is increasingly less influential was modeled by 
Latané’s (1981) social impact theory (SIT). Campbell and Fairey (1989) have argued that 
SIT is best suited as a model of normative influence. Although normative influence is 
often thought of as resulting from a need for approval (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) or the 
goal to build and maintain positive social relations (Cialdini & Trost, 1998), another 
possible source of normative influence is the need to coordinate social action brought on 
by ambiguous situations. Even a single interaction partner can induce a need to 
coordinate action or a need for approval. For instance, Asch (1955) found that a single 
dissenting confederate reduced conformity dramatically as long as they consistently 
dissented from the other confederates. He noted that participants were much more at ease 
with a single dissenter present than when no dissenters were present. Conolley (1964) 
found that when a judgment stimulus was ambiguous, the presence of only one partner 
resulted in considerable conformity (reported in Gerard, Wilhelmy, & Conolley, 1968). 
Arguably, an ambiguous stimulus requires some degree of negotiation between 
individuals to determine its meaning or purpose. A another example which more directly 
concerns action is Milgram, Bickman, and Berkowitz (1969), in which confederates 
stopped and looked up at a window on the sixth floor of a building, recording the number 
of passers-by who looked up in the same direction. The results showed that a single 
confederate had the most influence (40%), and that each additional confederate made less 
difference than the last. Similar patterns have been seen with bystander helping effects, 
where people are less likely to help someone in need if other people are around (Latané & 
Darley, 1968), tipping as a function of the number of people at a table (Freeman, Walker, 
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Borden, and Latané, 1975), and a variety of other social behaviors (for a review, see 
Latané, 1981).  
Consensus in Large Groups 
 Much of the research discussed so far was conducted with small groups, and 
clearly some interesting dynamics occur with very small groups. However, the dynamics 
involved in larger groups have received less attention. Of particular interest for this 
discussion are studies examining the relative influence of large and small majorities and 
minorities, which have been predominantly situated within the persuasion literature, 
rather than the conformity literature. For instance, Mackie (1987) had American students 
rate their agreement to the proposition that America should maintain military balance in 
the Western Hemisphere. After a filler task they listened to arguments for or against the 
proposition, which were said to be endorsed by an 82% majority and opposed by an 18% 
minority (or vice versa, depending on condition) of fellow students. After hearing the 
message, participants rated their agreement once again. Results showed that when 
participants found themselves in agreement with the majority, they were more persuaded 
than when they disagreed with a minority. Furthermore, processing of the argument was 
shown to be more systematic when among those in disagreement with the majority, 
suggesting that the majority status acted as a cue triggering scrutiny of the argument. 
Further studies varied the size of the majority (82% vs. 64%). However, no difference 
between large and small majorities was attained. Similar results were attained by 
Gardikiotis et al. (2005) and Martin et al. (2002). This result is somewhat surprising 
given the usual finding that larger groups are more influential than smaller groups; even 
if each additional group member adds little more influence, the function is nonetheless 
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increasing (Latané, 1981; Tanford & Penrod, 1984). Generally, researchers have 
concluded on the basis of these studies that people use majority status as a cue to the 
validity of social information but are insensitive to the size of the majority—a small 
consensus is apparently as good as a large one. 
However, two pilot studies conducted in the Group Processes Lab suggest that the 
size of a majority can make a difference. In a pair of pilot studies, participants performed 
a mental rotation task.  Over the course of a series of trials, participants were presented 
with two objects rotated at different angles, and they had to decide whether they were the 
same or different, a judgment that was accomplished by mentally rotating the objects to 
see if they match. Those that do not match are actually mirror images of each other. On 
each trial, after viewing the mental rotation stimuli, participants were presented with a 
piechart representing the ostensible percentage of Lehigh students who judged the objects 
to be the same and the percentage who judged them to be different. After viewing the 
piecharts, participants indicated with a key press whether the stimuli were the same or 
different.  
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions that varied the amount of time 
the mental rotation stimuli were presented. In an easy task condition, mental rotation 
stimuli were presented for 8000ms and in a difficult task condition, mental rotation 
stimuli were presented for 4000ms. The majority represented by the piecharts was correct 
half the time and incorrect half the time. Also, on half the trials the piecharts presented a 
60% majority and on the other half a 90% majority. Majority correctness and size were 
randomized between trials as a within-subject variable. Results revealed a three-way 
interaction between majority size, piechart correctness, and task difficulty.  In the easy 
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task condition, only a main effect of piechart correctness was attained (participant 
accuracy was greater when the majority in the piecharts were correct than when 
incorrect).  This pattern replicated the typical majority status effect (Gardikiotis et al., 
2005; Mackie, 1987; Martin et al., 2002), such that participants tended to conform to the 
majority but were insensitive to its size.  However, in the difficult task condition a two-
way interaction between piechart correctness and majority size was evident.  Participants 
in this condition conformed more to large than small majorities (i.e., the difference 
between correct and incorrect trials was greater for the large than the small majority). 
These results suggest that when the task gets more difficult, participants prefer to use a 
large majority over a small majority as a source of assistance in performing the task, as 
evidenced by the larger discrepancy in participant accuracy between correct and incorrect 
trials. That is, they may start to use majority size in addition to simple majority status as a 
cue to the validity of social information.  Previous research has shown that conformity in 
general increases as a function of task difficulty and individuals’ sense of uncertainty 
about their own judgment (e.g., Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Hochbaum, 1954; Coleman, 
Blake, & Mouton, 1958; Crutchfield, 1955).  However, little research has examined 
conformity as function of both group size and task difficulty (although see Chipman, 
1966; Nordholm, 1975). These pilot data suggest that it is important to look at both 
factors together because group size may only be useful to individuals with a heightened 
need for valid information from a social group.  
In order to investigate whether individuals can detect differences in the validity of 
a social majority by correlating majority size and performance over time, a second pilot 
study systematically varied the correlation of performance and size of a majority in a 
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similar paradigm as that implemented in the first pilot study. In a “competent majority” 
condition, participants viewed piecharts in which the majority was always a large 
majority when correct and a small majority when incorrect. In an “incompetent majority” 
condition, participants viewed piecharts where the majority was always small when 
correct and large when incorrect. The task was not so difficult as to render the 
participants always unable to make correct judgments; when they did make correct 
judgments, they were always in agreement with a large majority and in disagreement with 
a small majority in the competent majority condition. However, whenever the participant 
made a correct judgment in the incompetent majority condition, they were in agreement 
with a small majority and in disagreement with a large majority. If participants’ initial 
judgments were correct on a majority of trials, then they may have developed a sense of 
the general competence of the majorities represented by the piecharts. Importantly, in 
absolute terms the majorities shown in the piecharts were incorrect on half the trials in 
both conditions, so any differences in conformity between conditions would have resulted 
from noting the size of majorities making correct judgments over time, rather than the 
rate at which the majorities provided correct answers. Results showed greater conformity 
in the competent majority condition than in the incompetent majority condition (indexed 
as the discrepancy between performance on trials when the piecharts were correct vs. 
incorrect). Furthermore, a performance trajectory could be examined because this study 
had a large number of trials (256). Analysis revealed that the overall performance of 
incompetent majority participants improved over time, but the performance of competent 
majority participants did not. This result suggests that conformity to the competent 
majority actually hindered participants’ ability to learn the task, as they never established 
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independence from the group. This study demonstrated that even without a difference in 
task difficulty (rotation stimuli were presented for 6s) people can be sensitive to relative 
validity of social information.  Importantly in this case, participants were not simply 
sensitive to majority size, but rather the correlation between majority size and 
performance—making inferences about the competency of (value of conforming to) a 
group based on that assessment.  
Some evidence exists in the social influence literature to support the claim 
individuals do track the quality of social information over time. For instance, Moscovici 
(1980) argued that disagreement with a dissenting minority provokes a validation process 
whereby individuals evaluate the minority argument and undergo conversion if the 
argument is sound and the minority is consistent in its position (Moscovici, 1980, 1985; 
Nemeth, Swedlund, & Kanki, 1974). However, as mentioned earlier, the minority must 
be consistent over time and must maintain a more extreme position in order to be 
influential, suggesting something similar to the tracking of validity I am proposing here 
(Moscovici & Lage, 1976; Paicheler, 1976, 1977). Further, the minority influence 
literature generally suggests that majority arguments/positions do not receive such 
scrutiny.  Research from the developmental literature suggests that children track the 
reliability of adults and show preferential trust in novel information produced by those 
who were previously more reliable (e.g., Einav & Robinson, 2011; Harris & Corriveau, 
2011; Koenig, Clément, & Harris, 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005).  
Current Studies 
 I have outlined literature suggesting that different patterns of conformity should 
emerge as a function of the ongoing goals and needs of individuals. I have also argued 
 23 
that when the motivation exists to do so, individuals will scrutinize the group itself for 
validity as a source of information. The studies I describe below were designed to 
examine some of the motivational factors that would lead to the kind of scrutiny evident 
in the second pilot study. I propose that the primary driver of such scrutiny is an 
enhanced need for valid information. If an individual’s goal is to perform well on a task, 
then they will have an increased need for valid information during performance—the 
higher the perceived quality of information they have access to, the better they can expect 
to perform on the task. Furthermore, I propose that when an individual is uncertain about 
their own judgment, they have a special incentive to find quality information when 
making decisions and thus should find a large majority more compelling than a small 
majority.  
 In the first two studies, I implemented goal manipulations along with a similar 
paradigm as that implemented in the second pilot study. In the first study I used a 
payment scheme to alter the goal, performance or learning, with which participants 
performed the mental rotation task. I reasoned that if participants have social information 
available while performing a task for which they are being paid, they would be selective 
about whether they would use that information. On the other hand, if they were being 
paid on a subsequent block of trials during which no social information would be 
available, participants might have an incentive to avoid conformity altogether in order to 
develop an independent mastery of the task. Both types of goals are considered 
achievement goals, but the former is more outwardly oriented, and achievement serves 
the purpose of attaining external rewards, and the latter are more internally oriented 
(Elliott & Dweck, 1988). Although both types of goal should increase a need for valid 
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social information, performance goals require continuous success to be satisfied, 
especially when the size of reward depends on the number of correct trials, whereas 
failure on any given trial carries no immediate penalty with a learning goal. The second 
study implemented a goal priming procedure with both learning and performance goals in 
addition to a third type of goal, affiliation. I predicted that pursuing a learning or an 
affiliation goal should not motivate effortful tracking of majority competence, and thus 
should not result in differentiated conformity to competent and incompetent majorities. 
Learning, I reasoned, should be mostly self-motivated and fairly independent of social 
influence, and affiliation is satisfied simply by complying with group norms, regardless 
of that group’s validity as a source of information. Thus, only when participants pursue a 
performance goal should they be motivated to track the correlation of majority size and 
performance over time and conform more to a competent than incompetent majority.  
 The third study is a direct follow-up to the studies from the persuasion literature 
showing that majority size is not used as a cue to validity (Gardikiotis et al., 2005; 
Mackie, 1987; Martin et al., 2002). As I argued earlier, the more uncertain participants 
are about their own judgment, the more likely they should be to seek and comply with a 
valid source of information, and thus should be more persuaded by a large than small 
majority.  
Study 1 
 Participants in this study performed a mental rotation task similar to that 
employed in the pilot studies over the course of two blocks. During Block 1, after 
viewing the rotation stimuli on each trial, participants viewed a piechart indicating the 
ostensible percentage of fellow students who thought that the stimuli were the same or 
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different. All participants were informed before Block 1 that it was only on that block 
that they would see the social consensus information. Piecharts showed either a large or 
small majority, and the majority was either correct or incorrect. Participants in a 
(between-subjects) “competent majority” condition viewed piecharts with a majority that 
was consistently large when correct and small when incorrect. Participants in an 
“incompetent majority” condition viewed piecharts with a majority that was consistently 
small when correct and large when incorrect. Because the charts were wrong half the 
time in both conditions, majority status alone failed to provide any useful information 
about the reliability of the consensus information, and only the size of the majority in 
combination with its correctness could be used to make inferences about the quality of 
the social consensus information. But this property of the information would primarily be 
accessible to those participants sufficiently motivated to scrutinize it (e.g. by tracking the 
apparent competence of the group across trials).  
In an attempt to manipulate the motivation to scrutinize, I utilized a payment 
regime intended to manipulate participants’ goals to be accurate in judgment during 
Block 1. Participants in a (between-subjects) “performance goal” condition were told at 
the beginning of the study that they would be paid for performance during Block 1, 
whereas participants in a “learning goal” condition were told that they would be paid 
during Block 2. Presumably, participants in the performance goal condition would be 
more motivated to be accurate in their judgments during Block 1, and thus more likely to 
scrutinize the social information for its validity and conform more often to a competent 
than to an incompetent majority. I anticipated that no such difference would be evident 
among those in the learning goal condition, as they would be motivated to learn how to 
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perform the task independently of the consensus information since they knew this 
information would not be present during Block 2.  
I also predicted that if participants in the competent majority/performance goal 
condition relied more on the social information than participants in the other condition, 
they would also fail to learn the task as well as those in the other condition, and thus their 
performance on Block 2 would be worse relative to other participants’. In order to equate 
motivation in the goal conditions, just before Block 2 participants in the performance 
goal condition were informed that they would also be paid for performance on Block 2. 
Finally, at the end of the study participants were offered an opportunity to earn 
more money. The computer program presented one last rotation stimulus, and asked 
participants if they would like to invest some percentage of what they had already earned 
in a double-or-nothing bet that the majority was correct in its judgment. This measure 
was designed to allow an inference about whether or not participants in the learning goal 
condition also tracked the validity of the social information over time. If participants in 
the performance goal condition invested more in a competent than incompetent majority, 
but those in the learning goal condition did not, it would suggest that participants in the 
learning goal condition were not tracking the validity of the social information in Block 
1.  In contrast, if participants in both goal conditions invested more in a competent than 
incompetent majority, it would indicate that participants in the learning goal condition 
were tracking the social information, even if they did not utilize it while performing the 
task.   
Method 
Participants  
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Participants were 93 Lehigh undergraduates drawn from the Lehigh Psychology 
Department Participant Pool. Four participants were removed from the analysis, leaving 
89 participants. Two of these participants expressed awareness of critical manipulations
2
, 
and the other two were obviously distracted
3
.  
Procedure and Materials  
Participants arrived in groups of 1 to 4. An experimenter greeted the participants, 
sat them at individual computer stations, and provided basic information about the lab 
and study.  This included information that they would be paid for performance during 
part of the study, but they would not be paid until the study had been completed. 
Participants then read consent information on the computer monitor and clicked “y” if 
they agreed to participate. Next, participants read instructions for the mental rotation task 
and performed 20 practice trials. The mental ration stimuli were similar to those utilized 
by Shepard and Metzler (1971) and consisted of pairs of three-dimensional objects 
rotated at 80, 100, 120, 140, 160, or 180 degree angles. Half of the rotation stimuli were 
mirror images, and thus could not be rotated to match. The objective for the participant 
was to determine whether or not the stimuli could be matched, indicating that the stimuli 
were the “same” if they could or “different” if they could not. Immediately before the 
practice trials, participants reviewed an outline of the study (practice trials – first block – 
second block) which also explained that they would be paid for 5 cents for every correct 
answer during either Block 1 (performance goal condition) or Block 2 (learning goal 
condition).  
After the practice trials, instructions informed participants that 1000 Lehigh 
students had previously been tested on the mental rotation task, and that for each trial 
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during Block 1 they would view a piechart representing the percentage of students who 
thought that the stimuli were same and the percentage who thought that they were 
different. Participants were also reminded that they would be paid either on Block 1 or on 
Block 2 depending on goal condition (performance or learning, respectively). Each of the 
50 trials of Block 1 began with a 500ms presentation of a fixation cross followed by a 
6000ms presentation of the rotation stimuli followed by a 6000ms presentation of a 
piechart and finally a cue requesting response (press “1” if same or “2” if different). 
Piecharts varied systematically between competence conditions. Participants in the 
“competent majority” conditions viewed piecharts representing either a large correct 
majority or a small incorrect majority, and participants in the “incompetent majority” 
condition viewed piecharts representing either a small correct majority or a large 
incorrect majority. In both conditions, the majority (regardless of its size) was correct on 
50% of trials. Small majorities ranged from 55% to 65%, and large majorities ranged 
from 75% to 85%.   
 Presentation time for the rotation stimuli (6000ms) was selected based on the 
results from the first pilot study. In that study, 4000ms and 8000ms presentation times 
were employed, and the former proved to be more challenging than the latter. 
Presumably, when the presentation time was short, participants were less likely to get a 
sense of the correct answer, and so they relied on the piecharts more, especially when 
they represented large majorities (affording more confidence in their validity). In this 
study, I wanted for participants to be confident most of the time in their own judgment, 
but leave room for doubt on at least some of the trials by employing a short but not too 
short presentation time. Thus, on trials when participants did not come to a conclusion 
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about the correct answer, they would be more likely to rely on the piecharts as long as 
they viewed them as a valid source of information. The particular pattern of conformity 
on such trials, then, would depend on the motivation of the participant. When being paid 
(performance goal condition), participants require accuracy on every trial, and thus, they 
should be especially motivated to scrutinize the social information. As demonstrated by 
the second pilot study, one way they are likely to do this is by tracking performance on 
trials for which they are confident in their own judgment (assuming they have come to 
the correct conclusion) as it correlates to the size of majorities represented by the 
piecharts. On the other hand, those who are not being paid (learning goal condition), but 
instead preparing for the second block (on which they will be paid), participants should 
have an incentive to learn the task independently and little incentive to track the 
performance of the piecharts over time.  
Following Block 1, participants in the learning goal condition were reminded that 
they would be paid 5 cents for each correct answer during Block 2. Participants in the 
performance goal condition were informed that “the computer has now decided that you 
will also be paid for correct responses on this block of trials.” I implemented this 
payment regime in order to ensure that both groups of participants were motivated to 
perform accurately on the second block. Block 2 proceeded identically to the practice 
trials, except participants performed on 50 trials.  
Once Block 2 had been completed, participants were presented with the following 
message: “We are offering the opportunity to ‘invest’ some of the money that you have 
earned in the experiment thus far. Whatever percentage you decide to invest will be 
doubled if a majority of other Lehigh students who previously completed this trial 
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answered it correctly. However, you will lose your investment if a majority answered it 
incorrectly.” After reading this message, participants viewed a pair of rotation stimuli and 
indicated what percentage of their earnings they would be willing to invest.  
Before viewing the result of their investment, participants completed the 
collective identity scale (Packer, 2008). This scale was employed in order to determine 
whether any effects were due to changes in identification with the Lehigh student body. 
That is, it is possible that participants would have felt less identified with their fellow 
students when viewing consensus information from an apparently incompetent majority, 
and thus would have conformed less to distance themselves from their group. Items on 
the collective identity scale asked participants to rate their agreement with statements 
such as “Being a Lehigh student gives me a good feeling” and “I am not glad to be a 
Lehigh student” on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Negative items 
(7 in all) were reverse coded before analysis. All 15 items (α = .87) can be found in 
Appendix A. 
In addition to the collective identity scale, participants answered the question 
“How accurate do you think your own responses have been in the mental rotation task so 
far?” on a scale of 1 (very inaccurate) to 6 (very accurate). This question was included in 
order to determine whether participants’ subjective sense of their own competence on the 
task influenced decisions to conform or not. Those indicating that they were not very 
accurate may have done so because they were not very good at performing the task, and 
thus would value the utility of the social information more than someone who is better at 
the task and rated their performance as highly accurate (e.g., Chipman, 1966; Coleman, 
Blake, & Mouton, 1958; Crutchfield, 1955; Hochbaum, 1954; Nordholm, 1975). The 
 31 
possibility exists that the effects of validity on conformity are stronger among those 
rating their performance as low. Participants answered a number of other questions, but 
the results of those analyses will not be reported or discussed (see Appendix A for 
questions).  
Results 
Conformity – Block 1 
Conformity on the mental rotation task can be indexed in terms of the difference 
in accuracy participants display when the social information they receive is correct vs. 
incorrect – the greater the difference, the more their responses are swayed by the group’s.  
The primary prediction for the first analysis (conformity during Block 1) was a three way 
interaction between goal, majority competence, and piechart correctness, such that 
participants in the performance goal condition would show a greater difference in 
accuracy between correct and incorrect piechart trials (i.e., greater conformity) in the 
competent majority condition than in the incompetent majority condition. In contrast, I 
hypothesized that there would be no such difference between the majority competence 
conditions among participants in the learning goal condition.  
Analysis of performance on Block 1 focused on the accuracy of response to the 
mental rotation stimuli. For each trial, the participant’s response is either correct or 
incorrect, resulting in a binary dependent variable. Given that a binary dependent variable 
is unlikely to yield normally distributed residuals, a general linear model (GLM) analysis 
is inappropriate for this analysis. Thus, I employed a generalized linear mixed model 
(GLMM) analysis, a generalization of the GLM that includes a link function (in this case, 
the LOGIT function), which maps binary data to an unbounded space that is more likely 
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to yield normally distributed residuals. This model also contains a mixed component, 
which allows for the modeling of random and within-subject variables. For the sake of 
simplicity, I limited random effects to between-subject differences in overall performance 
(that is, the analysis models the intercept as a random effect). However, inclusion of 
variables such as angle and trial as random effects could have increased power to detect 
significant effects, as doing so would potentially make it possible to account for more 
variance.  
For each trial, participants’ responses were coded as either 0 (incorrect) or 1 
(incorrect). Because the generalized linear model assumes normally distributed residuals, 
and it is highly unlikely that a normally distributed error term would predict a doubly 
bounded probability space, the GLIMMIX procedure utilizes a link function which 
transforms the accuracy data utilizing the logit function, which creates an unbounded 
probability space with a more normal distribution. In the interest of clarity, means and 
figures will be presented as percentages, transformed by the inverse logit function.   
All data were submitted to a 2 (goal: performance vs. learning) x 2 (majority 
competence: competent vs. incompetent) x 2 (piechart correctness: correct vs. incorrect) 
GLMM analysis. The three independent variables were effects-coded (goal: -1 = mastery, 
1 = performance; majority competence: -1 = incompetent, 1 = competent; piechart 
correctness: -1 = incorrect, 1 = correct). Analysis revealed a main effect of majority 
competence (F(1,4357) = 5.00, p = .03) such that participants in the competent majority 
condition (M = 85.09) were more accurate than those in the incompetent majority 
condition (M = 79.21), and a main effect of piechart correctness (F(1,4357) = 107.52, p < 
.01) such that participants were more accurate when the piecharts were correct (M = 
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87.67) than when incorrect (M = 75.36).  Further, there was an interaction between 
majority competence and piechart correctness (F(1,4357) = 4.26, p = .03) such that the 
difference in accuracy when piecharts were correct vs. incorrect was greater in the 
competent majority than incompetent majority condition (see Figure 3). However, the 
predicted three-way interaction was not attained (F(1,4357) = 1.51, p = .22).  
 Although this analysis failed to attain the predicted three-way analysis, some 
insight may be gained by examining the pattern of means (see Figure 4). Visual 
inspection of the means suggests greater conformity by learning goal participants to the 
competent majority than to the incompetent majority, but equal conformity by 
performance goal participants to both majorities. To more formally test this, I performed 
separate analyses within each goal condition with majority competence and pie chart 
correctness predicting accuracy. The results of this analysis support my assessment, with 
both a main effect of piechart correctness (F(1,2350) = 76.3, p < .01) and an interaction 
between piechart correctness and majority competence (F(1,2350) = 5.75, p = .02) in the 
learning goal condition, but only a main effect of piechart correctness (F(1,2007) = 
36.17, p < .01) in the performance goal condition. Although the non-significant nature of 
the three-way interaction renders this analysis inconclusive, the pattern of means suggests 
that participants in the learning goal condition treated Block 1 in a similar manner as 
participants in the second pilot study, but participants in the performance goal condition 
treated both majorities equally. This result suggests that heightened scrutiny did not 
occur, contrary and in some ways opposite to what I had predicted. Thus, it would appear 
that performance goal participants evidenced only a majority effect, as seen in previous 
studies (e.g., Gardikiotis et al., 2005; Mackie, 1987; Martin et al., 2002).  
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 Follow-up analysis. Prior research has demonstrated that conformity increases 
when tasks are more difficult and when individuals lack confidence in their own 
judgment (e.g., Chipman, 1966; Coleman, Blake, & Mouton, 1958; Crutchfield, 1955; 
Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Hochbaum, 1954; Nordholm, 1975). I have argued that 
heightened scrutiny of social information should be most apparent when individuals have 
a high need for accuracy. Presumably, this need would result from a performance goal, 
but perhaps people with high confidence in their own performance would derive little 
utility from conforming to piecharts that contradict their judgment half the time. 
However, people with less confidence in their own performance might be more likely to 
see the majority as a useful source of information. As I have argued, however, the greater 
the need for accuracy, the more likely even uncertain participants should scrutinize the 
social information for validity. In this study, participants were asked to answer the 
question “How accurate do you think your own responses have been in the mental 
rotation task so far?” I conducted an analysis with this variable (perceived own accuracy) 
as a predictor of conformity along with goal, majority competence, and piechart 
correctness in order to determine if the predicted pattern of conformity from the main 
analysis would be evident among participants with low perceived own accuracy but not 
among those with high perceived own accuracy. That is, among participants with low 
perceived own accuracy, greater conformity should be evident in the competent than 
incompetent majority condition for performance goal participants, but equal for learning 
goal participants.  
To examine this hypothesis, I performed a GLMM analysis with goal, majority 
competence, piechart correctness, and participants’ perceptions of their own accuracy 
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predicting accuracy. Perceived own accuracy was centered about its mean (M = 3.92, SD 
= 1.04). Results from this analysis reveal a main effect of perceived own accuracy 
(F(1,4353) = 31.98, p < .001) such that higher perceived own accuracy scores predicted 
higher accuracy, which suggests that participants generally had a fairly veridical 
perception of their own performance. In addition, there as a three-way interaction 
between perceived own accuracy, goal, and piechart correctness (F(1,4353) = 8.31, p = 
.004, see Figure 5). Among those scoring low (one standard deviation below the mean) 
on perceived own accuracy, the discrepancy between correct and incorrect trials was 
greater for learning goal participants than for performance goal participants (t(4355) = 
3.12, p = .002).  In contrast, among those scoring high on perceived own accuracy (one 
standard deviation above the mean), the discrepancy between correct and incorrect trials 
was not significantly different between goal conditions (t(4355) = -1.45, p = .148). There 
was also a three-way interaction between perceived own accuracy, goal and majority 
competence (F(1,4353) = 4.20, p = .04, see Figure 6). Among those scoring low (one 
standard deviation below the mean) on perceived own accuracy, the discrepancy between 
performance between the competence conditions was significant only among learning 
goal participants (t(4359) = 7.28, p = .007).  In contrast, among those scoring high on the 
perceived own accuracy (one standard deviation above the mean), there was no 
significant discrepancy between competence conditions for either goal condition.  
 The results of this analysis suggest that among participants with high perceived 
own accuracy, conformity was minimal and did not vary by goal condition, as predicted. 
However, the predictions for low perceived own accuracy were not supported by these 
analyses. Conformity, as indexed by the correct-incorrect trial discrepancy, was higher 
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among learning goal participants than performance goal participants, the opposite of what 
had been predicted. Further, performance was worse with an incompetent majority than 
with a competent majority among learning goal participants but not among performance 
goal participants, who did not vary between competence conditions. This result may 
suggest that learning goal participants conformed mostly to large majorities rather than 
small majorities, since large majorities were always correct in the competent majority 
condition and incorrect in the incompetent majority condition. That is, if participants 
heuristically conformed only to large majorities but did not assess the performance of the 
majorities over time, then performance would be much lower in the incompetent majority 
condition, which is exactly what happened. This result could suggest that learning goal 
participants conformed more to the social information, but did not engage in effortful 
analysis of its validity. Rather, conformity was driven by a strictly heuristic preference 
for large majorities. Perhaps the learning goal increased the need for accuracy, resulting 
in a stricter criterion for conformity (endorsement by a large majority), but not enough to 
result in the more effortful tracking of competence over time. As for performance goal 
participants, without an interaction between majority competence and piechart 
correctness, nothing can be said about heightened scrutiny.  
Learning – Block 2 
 The primary prediction of this analysis was that participants who conformed more 
often during Block 1 would perform worse during Block 2. Had performance on Block 1 
been affected by goals, majority competence, and piechart correctness as hypothesized, 
the predictions for this analysis would have mirrored those of Block 1—that is, 
performance goal participants with an incompetent majority would not perform as well as 
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those with an incompetent majority and learning goal participants would not differ by 
competence condition. However, in light of the failure to attain the predicted three-way 
interaction in Block 1, those hypotheses no longer make sense. Thus, I employed an 
analysis to determine, overall, whether greater conformity on Block 1 led to poorer 
performance on Block 2.  
The analysis utilized the discrepancy in performance between correct and 
incorrect trials on Block 1 to predict performance on Block 2. I created a new variable 
(conformity) with the percent difference in accuracy between correct and incorrect trials 
(piechart correct – piechart incorrect) averaged across Block 1. Using this variable, I 
performed a GLMM analysis with goal, majority competence, and conformity predicting 
Block 2 accuracy. Analysis revealed a main effect of conformity on Block 2 accuracy 
(F(1,4361) = 13.47, p < .001) such that higher conformity scores predict lower accuracy 
(β = -1.78), which clearly suggests that higher conformity during Block 1 led to poorer 
performance during Block 2. This result supports the hypothesis that greater conformity 
(indexed as a discrepancy between correct and incorrect Block 1 trials) leads to 
diminished learning of the task. Furthermore, there was a main effect of goal (F(1,4361) 
= 4.32, p = .038) such that, on average, learning goal participants (M = 87.72) performed 
better than performance goal participants (M = 82.56). This result, combined with the 
perceived own accuracy result, provides evidence that the goal manipulation was 
effective, as it seems that learning goal participants learned the task better than 
performance goal participants. 
Investment 
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For the third analysis (investment), I anticipated either a main effect of majority 
competence, such that participants would invest more in the competent majority, or a two 
way interaction between goal and majority competence such that only participants with a 
performance goal would invest more in a competent majority than in an incompetent 
majority. 
Two participants did not answer the investment question, leaving the analysis 
with 87 participants. Analysis focused on the percentage of earned money participants 
were willing to invest. Data were submitted to a 2 (goal: performance vs. learning) x 2 
(majority competence: competent vs. incompetent) general linear model analysis. Results 
reveal a main effect of majority competence (F(1,83) = 5.70, p = .02) such that 
investment percentage was higher in a competent (M = 53%) than incompetent (M = 
38%) majority, but no interaction was attained (F(1,83) = 0.47, p = .49). This analysis 
suggests that participants were sensitive to the competence of the majority, regardless of 
goal condition.  
Collective Identity 
 Collective identity scores were submitted to a GLM analysis with goal and 
majority competence predicting collective identity. No significant main effects or 
interactions of the two predictor variables were obtained (goal: F(1,85) = 0.03, p = .87; 
majority competence: F(1,85) = 0.18, p = .68; interaction: F(1,85) = 0.01, p = .94). This 
indicates that effects in the previous analyses were not the consequence of conditions 
affecting identification with Lehigh students (which might have resulted in participants’ 
distancing themselves from the majority).  
Discussion 
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 The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of performance and learning 
goals on the scrutiny of social information. I hypothesized that participants with a 
performance goal would be motivated more than participants with a learning goal to track 
the performance of a social majority over time, using the size of majorities agreeing trial-
by-trial with their own judgment as a cue to validity. Greater conformity to the 
“competent majority” than to the “incompetent” majority (indexed as the difference in 
performance between correct and incorrect piechart trials) would have provided evidence 
of this process. In the learning goal condition, I predicted that participants would conform 
less and show little difference between majority competence conditions. The primary 
analyses did not support my hypotheses, as the predicted three-way interaction was not 
significant. The pattern of means in the interaction was not suggestive of support for the 
hypothesis either.  
I also conducted follow-up analyses using perceived own accuracy as a predictor 
variable, hypothesizing that the predictions of the main analysis would be evident among 
participants with low perceived own accuracy but not among those with high perceived 
own accuracy. Only the predictions for high perceived own accuracy were supported 
(that is, that no interactions would be attained). In some ways, the opposite of what had 
been predicted was evident among participants with low perceived own accuracy. 
Conformity was more evident in the learning goal condition than in the performance goal 
condition. However, the interaction between goal and majority competence might suggest 
that conformity was primarily to large majorities. Without baseline trials (indicating 
baseline performance, with no influence), and an interaction between both majority 
competence and piechart correctness, it is impossible to be certain whether this is correct. 
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If it is, it may suggest that the learning goal induced a higher standard than just majority 
status for selection of social information for conformity, but the motivation was not 
strong enough to more rigorously assess the quality of the information by tracking its 
performance over time. None of the predicted interactions occurred among performance 
goal participants, who showed evidence of some conformity, but no interactive effects. 
Perhaps the payment scheme raised the stakes too high for performance goal participants, 
and having noticed that the piecharts were frequently wrong, they preferred not to risk 
their payoff by conforming. 
I also examined whether increased conformity would result in decreased learning 
of the task. Analyses suggest that indeed this is the case. Participants who conformed 
more during Block 1 had poorer performance on Block 2 than those who conformed less 
during Block 1. The current finding suggests that this type of measure could be usefully 
implemented in future studies.  
Study 2 
 One purpose for this study was to examine the influence of a third type of goal: 
affiliation. In Study 1, I argued that people who are motivated to learn how to perform a 
task should be less likely to conform to social consensus information, as prolonged 
conformity would not be useful in learning how to do something oneself. In contrast, if 
people are motivated to affiliate with a group, then they should be more likely to conform 
to that group’s social consensus information, irrespective of its apparent validity. 
Arguably, conforming to a group’s norms and demonstrating similarity to its members is 
instrumental to affiliating with that group (for a review, see Cialdini & Trost, 1998; 
Levine, 1989). 
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 A second purpose for this study was to conceptually replicate the first study using 
a different type of goal manipulation: priming. Goal priming involves exposing 
participants to words and objects associated with particular goals of interest, which often 
results in behavior consistent with the active pursuit of the target goal. For instance, 
Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel (2001) embedded either 
achievement-oriented or neutral words in a word search task. As the authors predicted, 
participants with the achievement oriented word search task found more words than those 
with the neutral word search task. Numerous studies since the Bargh et al. (2001) paper 
have had similar results for a variety of goals using a multitude of priming manipulations 
(see Bargh, 2006, for a review). Priming manipulations can be performed independently 
from the target task on which participants’ behavior is measured. For instance, studies 
using the “unrelated studies” paradigm, where the priming task and the target task are 
treated as different studies in different labs, demonstrate that performance on a target task 
is consistent with pursuit of the goal from the priming task (Hassin, Bargh, & Zimerman, 
2009). This study will use a similar goal priming manipulation, where participants first 
perform a word search task and then a mental rotation task. Following a long block of 
trials with pie charts to assess conformity, as in Study 1, participants will perform a short 
block of trials without the pie charts in order to assess learning. Predictions are similar to 
those in Study 1 for the performance and learning goal conditions and as outlined above 
for the affiliation condition.  
Method 
Participants  
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Participants were 172 Lehigh undergraduates drawn from the Lehigh Psychology 
Department Participant Pool. Eight participants’ data were excluded because they did not 
complete the study, did not follow instructions, or experienced a malfunction in the 
experimental software, leaving 164 participants.  
Procedure and Materials 
 Participants arrived in groups of 1 to 4. An experimenter greeted the participants, 
sat them at individual computer stations, and provided basic information about the lab 
and study. Participants then read consent information on the computer monitor and 
clicked “y” if they agreed to participate.  
 After completing the consent process, participants read instructions for the word 
search puzzle, which consisted of a 13 x 13 matrix of letters and a list of words to be 
found. Each puzzle had four neutral words (lamp, plant, carpet, turtle) and eight goal 
relevant words (affiliation: together, affiliate, friend, partner, ally, team, bond, 
comradery; learning: learn, advance, refine, improve, develop, study, progress, train; 
performance: beat, prize, overcome, prevail, succeed, triumph, trophy, victory). 
Participants were instructed to find as many words as they could, that words would be 
presented forward, up, down, or diagonal, and that they could take as long as necessary.  
The priming manipulation employed in this study is similar to that used by Bargh 
et al. (2001), Engeser (2009), and Hassin et al. (2009). Those researchers examined the 
priming of more general achievement goals, and so words used in their prime were 
relevant both to performance and learning. In order to find a set of words to use for each 
of the three goals, I conducted a pilot test where I presented 45 participants, recruited 
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service, with a list of 43 words that a priori seemed to 
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be associated with each of the three goals (see Table 1 for the full list) in random order 
and asked them to group the words together into as many categories as they thought 
appropriate (up to a maximum of six). Participants’ category decisions were submitted to 
a multidimensional scaling analysis in PASW. The procedure created distances from the 
data and modeled it with two dimensions (R
2
 = .77; see Figure 7). Visual examination 
suggested that, indeed, the words clumped into three categories corresponding to 
performance, learning and affiliation. I selected eight words for each goal that appeared 
to be central to the category. 
Following the priming task, participants read instructions for the mental rotation 
task and performed 6 practice trials. Trial-by-trial, the mental rotation task was identical 
to that used in Study 1. The two exceptions were that only 100, 120, 140, 160, and 180 
degree angles were employed and decreased amount of time the piecharts were presented 
to 2000ms. I excluded the 80 degree angles in order to make the task a bit more difficult, 
contributing to participants’ uncertainty regarding their own judgment and thereby 
increasing the likelihood of conformity. Following the practice trials, participants 
performed 70 trials of the mental rotation task with pie charts (Block 1).  However, 
twenty out of the 70 were baseline trials and did not present social information, but 
instead a message indicating that no information was available. Next, participants 
performed 20 more trials of the mental rotation task without pie charts (Block 2) to assess 
whether learning was affected by conformity during Block 1. Finally, after completing 
Block 2, participants answered the same questions as in Study 1 about their impressions 
of their own and the group’s performance, as well as the collective identity scale (Packer, 
2008).  
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Results 
Conformity 
 As in Study 1, conformity was indexed as the difference between correct and 
incorrect piechart trials during Block 1. I predicted a three way interaction between goal, 
majority competence, and piechart correctness such that conformity would not differ 
between competent and incompetent majority conditions in both the affiliation and 
learning goal conditions, but would be greater with the competent than incompetent 
majority in the performance goal condition.  As argued earlier, a performance goal should 
increase an individual’s need for accurate social information, since the objective is to 
produce correct trial-by-trial results. Hence, they should be motivated to evaluate the 
social information in an effortful manner, using majority size and their own judgment to 
track performance of the majority over time. I also hypothesized that conformity would 
be greater on average among affiliation than learning goal participants, since conformity 
is a means by which to satisfy an affiliation goal, but not a learning goal, which would be 
better satisfied by independent performance of the task.  
The inclusion of baseline trials (those with no piechart) also affords an additional 
and perhaps more precise measure of conformity. In a given competence condition, if 
baseline accuracy falls somewhere between correct and incorrect trials, then conformity 
can be thought of as equal on each of those two types of trials, suggesting a general 
conformity to the piecharts. However, if baseline accuracy is closer to one type of trial 
but more discrepant from the other type, then conformity can be said to have occurred 
only with a large or small majority within that competence condition. For instance, 
suppose baseline accuracy in the competent majority condition is the same between the 
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baseline and incorrect piechart trials but accuracy is much higher during correct piechart 
trials, then it can be inferred that participants conformed mostly to piecharts with a large 
consensus, as with the first pilot study. Analysis involving baseline trials were 
exploratory in nature, so I made no a priori predictions. However, if a similar result to 
Study 1 is evident, then the baseline trials may be useful in clarifying the nature of that 
effect.  
 Analysis of performance on Block 1 focused on the accuracy of responses to the 
mental rotation stimuli. All data were submitted to a 3 (goal: performance vs. learning vs. 
affiliation) x 2 (majority competence: competent vs. incompetent) x 2 (piechart 
correctness: correct vs. incorrect) GLMM analysis. The independent variables were 
treated as categorical variables for this analysis. The analysis revealed a main effect of 
piechart correctness (F(2,11564) = 62.3, p < .001) such that baseline trials (M = 78.81) 
were less than correct piechart trials (M = 83.41) and greater than incorrect piechart trials 
(M = 72.74). Furthermore, there was a two-way interaction between majority competence 
and piechart correctness (F(2,11564) = 7.07, p = < .001). Visual inspection suggests that 
the discrepancy accuracy between trials when the group was correct versus incorrect was 
greater in the competent than incompetent majority condition, a result which replicates 
the second pilot study. However, as in Study 1, the predicted three-way interaction 
between goal, majority competence, and piechart correctness was not significant 
(F(4,11564) = 1.33, p = .255).  
Baseline trials. Examination of baseline trials in the majority competence by 
piechart correctness interaction may provide insight into the nature of the conformity 
evidenced by that interaction. Baseline trials did not differ from correct piechart trials in 
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the incompetent majority condition (t(11564) = -1.06, p = .896), but did differ from 
incorrect piechart trials (t(11564) = -5.08, p < .001); that is, incorrect responses from the 
incompetent majority worsened participants’ performance, but correct responses did not 
improve it. On the other hand, both incorrect piechart trials (t(11564) = -3.55, p = .005) 
and correct piechart trials (t(11564) = -6.05, p < .001) differ from baseline in the 
competent majority condition (see Figure 8). This result suggests that participants 
conformed to the piecharts generally, but those in the incompetent majority condition did 
not. Instead, it seems that they only conformed to large majorities (heuristically) if they 
conformed at all.  
Follow-up analyses. As in Study 1, I utilized participants’ perceived own 
accuracy as a means to examine whether the predicted effects would be evident among 
participants who were low in perceived own accuracy but not among those who were 
high in perceived own accuracy. To reiterate the hypotheses, among participants with low 
perceived own accuracy, I anticipated a three-way interaction between goal, majority 
competence, and piechart correctness such that conformity does not differ between 
competence conditions in the affiliation and learning goal conditions, but in the 
performance goal condition, conformity is greater in the competent than incompetent 
majority condition. I did not expect to see this pattern among participants high in 
perceived own accuracy.  
I conducted a GLMM analysis with goal, majority competence, piechart 
correctness, and perceived own accuracy predicting trial-by-trial accuracy during Block 
1. Because goal and piechart correctness had three levels, I split each of those variables 
into two effect coded variables (goal 1: affiliation = 1, learning = 0, performance = -1; 
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goal 2: affiliation = 0, learning = 1, performance = -1; piechart 1: incorrect = 1, baseline 
= 0, correct = -1; piechart 2: incorrect = 0, baseline = 1, correct = -1).  I also effect coded 
majority competence (incompetent = -1, competent = 1), and centered perceived own 
accuracy about its mean (M = 3.96, SD = 1.01).  
Analysis revealed a main effect of perceived own accuracy (F(1,11622) = 62.85, 
p < .001) such that higher scores predicted higher accuracy (β = .40, t(11551) = 2.18, p = 
.029). Furthermore, there was two-way interaction between perceived own accuracy and 
piechart correctness (F(2,11622) = 5.39, p = .005), with a greater discrepancy between 
correct and incorrect piechart trials among those scoring low than those scoring high on 
perceived own accuracy (t(11549) = 2.48, p < .013; see Figure 9). These results suggest 
that, in general, participants with perceived own accuracy conformed more than those 
with high perceived own accuracy. 
A marginally significant four-way interaction between perceived own accuracy, 
goal, majority competence, and piechart correctness (F(4,11622) = 2.13, p = .074) may 
qualify the effects reported above. Figure 10 provides means for the two-way interactions 
between majority competence and piechart correctness for each of the three goals and for 
low and high perceived own accuracy. As can be seen in Figure 10, the predictions for 
low perceived own accuracy were nearly attained in the affiliation and performance goal 
conditions.  
In the affiliation goal condition, conformity should not differ between majority 
competence conditions. This hypothesis was confirmed, as evidenced by a non-
significant two-way interaction between majority competence and the correct-incorrect 
piechart contrast (t(11549) = -0.37, p = .714). Conformity was evidenced by a significant 
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difference between accuracy on correct and incorrect piechart trials in both competence 
conditions (incompetent: t(11550) = 21.44, p < .001; competent: t(11550) = 24.54, p < 
.001). Furthermore, in the competent majority condition, baseline trials differed 
significantly from both correct (t(11549) = -2.93, p = .003) and incorrect trials (t(11549) 
= 2.09, p = .037), suggesting overall conformity to the consensus in that condition. The 
incompetent majority condition was a little different—only correct piechart trials differed 
significantly from baseline trials (correct vs. baseline: t(11550) = 9.78, p = .002; incorrect 
vs. baseline: t(11550) = 2.45, p = .118), which might suggest somewhat different 
conformity dynamics between majority competence conditions. However, note that 
baseline performance appears worse in the incompetent majority condition than in the 
competent majority condition (although the difference is not significant, t(11549) = 1.92, 
p = .166). It is possible that a floor effect prevented the observation of a significant 
difference in that case. In general, the pattern of results support the original hypothesis, 
albeit imperfectly. Conformity was evident and did not differ as a function of majority 
competence among participants with low perceived own accuracy in the affiliation goal 
condition. 
As for the performance goal condition, recall that conformity should differ as a 
function of majority competence in the performance goal condition, a hypothesis that was 
confirmed by a significant two-way interaction between majority competence and the 
correct-incorrect piechart contrast (t(11548) = -3.23, p = .001). As predicted, there was a 
significant difference between correct and incorrect piechart trials in the competent 
majority condition (t(11548) = -4.79, p < .001) but not in the incompetent majority 
condition (t(11548) = -1.52, p = .12). Interestingly, only the correct piechart trials 
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differed significantly from baseline trials (correct vs. baseline: t(11548) = 4.44, p < .001; 
incorrect vs. baseline: t(11548) = -0.40, p = .692), perhaps suggesting a special 
preference for a large consensus even within a competent majority. However, the effect 
could well be a floor effect. In general, the hypothesis was supported. Participants with 
low perceived own accuracy in the performance goal condition tracked the apparent 
quality of social information over trials, and conformed to the competent but not 
incompetent majority. 
Given general support for hypotheses regarding the affiliation and performance 
goal conditions, results from the learning goal condition were surprising. First, recall that 
conformity was predicted to be low compared to the affiliation goal condition. However, 
the difference in conformity (indexed as the difference in performance between correct 
and incorrect piechart trials) between affiliation and learning goal conditions was non-
significant in both incompetent (t(11548) = -0.33, p = .741) and competent (t(11550) = -
0.12, p = .904) majority conditions. On the other hand, the hypothesis that conformity 
would not differ between competence conditions was supported by a two-way interaction 
between majority competence and the correct-incorrect piechart contrast (t(11549) = 
0.32, p = .569) and significant differences between correct and incorrect piechart trials in 
both the incompetent (t(11548) = 14.66, p < .001) and competent (t(11550) = 24.50, p < 
.001) majority conditions. Interestingly, examination of the baseline trials suggests these 
participants conformed to large majorities only. In the incompetent majority condition, 
performance was significantly worse on incorrect piechart trials (t(11548) = -2.95, p = 
.003) than on the other two types of trials, which did not differ (t(11548) = 0.90, p = 
368); recall that large majorities were always incorrect in this condition. On the other 
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hand, in the competent majority condition, where large majorities were always correct, 
performance was significantly higher on correct piechart trials (t(11550) = 13.48, p < 
.001) than on the other two, which were not significantly different (t(11550) = 1.88, p = 
.171). What these results suggest is that learning goal participants low in perceived own 
accuracy employed a heuristic conformity to large but not small majorities, congruent 
with the proposed explanation for the results in Study 1 where performance was worse 
for learning goal participants in the incompetent majority condition than in the competent 
majority condition. Although unpredicted, these results are nonetheless interesting, and 
suggest that there is more to the dynamics of learning as it pertains to conformity than 
anticipated.  
 High perceived own accuracy results are difficult to interpret, especially given a 
lack of a priori hypotheses. However, given that conformity decreases with increased task 
difficulty and task relevant self-efficacy, then it would be expected that social influence is 
less powerful, generally, among those with high perceived own accuracy, which is 
supported by the two-way interaction between the correct-incorrect piechart contrast and 
perceived own accuracy (averaged across goal and majority competence; t(11549) = 2.48, 
p = .013) such that conformity (indexed as the difference in performance between correct 
and incorrect piechart trials) was greater among participants low than high in perceived 
own accuracy. I will reserve further interpretation of the results for the discussion, as the 
lack of a priori hypotheses renders such interpretation speculative.  
Learning 
 As with Study 1, the influence of conformity on learning was assessed by 
calculating an average discrepancy score between correct and incorrect trials for each 
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participant and utilizing the discrepancy variable, along with goal and majority 
competence, to predict accuracy on Block 2 in a GLMM analysis. Results show a main 
effect of discrepancy (F(1,2281) = 10.22, p = .001) such that greater conformity in Block 
1 resulted in lower accuracy in Block 2. In addition, there was a two-way interaction 
between goal and majority competence (F(2,2281) = 7.55, p < .001). Visual inspection 
suggests that accuracy was lower with the incompetent than competent majority 
condition among performance goal participants only (see Figure 11). Recall that 
performance goal participants with low perceived own accuracy generally performed 
poorly during Block 1, and gained nothing in performance as a consequence of 
conformity, since they apparently did not conform at all. In contrast, conformity was 
evident among both affiliation and learning goal participants, and their performance was 
much better than that of performance goal participants during Block 2. Perhaps 
conformity actually benefits those who have a difficult time with the task. The two-way 
interaction may be driven primarily by the performance of participants with low 
perceived own accuracy. Indeed, there was a three way interaction between discrepancy, 
goal, and majority competence (F(2,2281) = 3.69, p = .025), such that low conformity 
participants exhibited the pattern described above, but the effects were attenuated among 
high conformity participants (see Figure 12). If my interpretation is correct, this result 
may help to explain why learning goal participants still conformed. Perhaps my original 
assumption that learning would be hindered by conformity was not entirely correct, and 
conformity is actually beneficial to those who have a difficult time with a task. Research 
on social learning (e.g., Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1961; Lee, Dineen, McKendree, & 
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Mayes, 1999) suggests that such learning occurs; perhaps it is the case that social 
learning is most efficacious for those with the most to learn.  
Collective Identity 
 Collective identity scores were submitted to a GLM analysis with goal and 
majority competence predicting collective identity. No significant main effects or 
interactions of the two predictor variables were obtained (goal: F(2,156) = 0.32, p = .728; 
majority competence: F(1,156) = 1.07, p = .304; interaction: F(1,156) = 0.96, p = .386). 
This indicates that effects in the previous analyses were not the consequence of 
conditions affecting identification with Lehigh students (which might have resulted in 
participants’ distancing themselves from the majority).  
Discussion 
 Similar to Study 1, the purpose of this study was to examine how specific goals 
(i.e., affiliation, learning, performance) motivate the use of majority size as a cue for 
decisions about conformity. I anticipated that only with a performance goal would 
participants be motivated to track the performance of a majority over time by comparing 
their own judgment to the judgment of small and large majorities. Evidence of this 
process would be found in greater conformity to a competent majority than to an 
incompetent majority. With affiliation and learning goals, I did not anticipate differential 
conformity to competent and incompetent majorities. Instead, I anticipated strong 
conformity to both majorities with an affiliation goal and little or no conformity to either 
majority with a learning goal.  
 The results of the main analysis did not support my hypotheses. The predicted 
three-way interaction between goal, majority competence, and piechart correctness was 
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not significant. However, the main analysis did appear to conceptually replicate the 
results of the second pilot study, where conformity (indexed as the difference between 
correct and incorrect piechart trials) was greater with the competent than incompetent 
majority. Examination of the baseline trials seems to suggest that participants conformed 
to both a small and large consensus with a competent majority but only to a large 
consensus (which was consistently incorrect, interestingly) with an incompetent majority. 
Taken alone, this result suggests either that the goal priming manipulation failed to 
induce the anticipated goals, or that the dynamics of conformity do not change between 
these three types of goals. Follow-up analyses including participants’ perceptions of their 
own accuracy suggest that neither conclusion is entirely warranted.  
 As argued earlier, if people feel less confident about their own judgment, then 
they should be more likely to seek social consensus as a source of information (e.g., 
Chipman, 1966; Coleman, Blake, & Mouton, 1958; Crutchfield, 1955; Deutsch & 
Gerard, 1955; Hochbaum, 1954; Nordholm, 1975). I argued that under conditions of 
uncertainty, the predicted patterns of conformity with respect to goal would become 
evident. This hypothesis was mostly confirmed in the performance and affiliation goal 
conditions. Affiliation goal participants with low perceived own accuracy conformed 
equally to both majorities, and performance goal participants only conformed to the 
competent majority. Learning goal participants also conformed equally between 
majorities, but they apparently only conformed to large majorities. This result was 
surprising, but potentially informative, especially because a similar pattern was observed 
in Study 1. Originally, I argued that a learning goal should motivate independence from 
influence, and this may be so among those who are more confident in their judgment, but 
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perhaps low confidence results in a greater need for a model from which to learn. With 
this heightened need, perhaps a stricter heuristic than “consensus is correctness” is 
applied in determining whom to conform to. If nothing else, it is clear that the dynamics 
of learning goals are more complex than originally anticipated.  
 While the low perceived own accuracy results were mostly intelligible, the high 
perceived own accuracy results were less easily interpreted (see Figure 10). The primary 
reason for this is that no a priori hypotheses had been proposed. Speculation is possible 
nonetheless. Arguably, the dynamics of conformity should be the same between those 
with low and high perceived own accuracy with an affiliation goal, as conforming to 
norms is presumably the way to satisfy that goal. However, the participants were students 
at a prestigious science and engineering university, where intellectual competence is a 
norm, and so those with more confidence in their own judgment were engaging in 
normative behavior by exercising independence from the majority (Hornsey & Jetten, 
2005). In other words, performance is normative for Lehigh students, and thus to affiliate 
is to adopt a performance goal when possible. Thus, the pattern of results for high 
perceived own accuracy affiliation goal participants is similar to low perceived own 
accuracy performance goal participants (see Table 2 for test statistics). Learning goal 
participants with high perceived own accuracy performed as originally expected for all 
learning goal participants. That is, there was very little conformity (the contrasts suggest 
that conformity was not nonexistent, see Table 2), and majority competence made no 
difference at all. Results from the performance goal condition suggest that performance 
goal participants did not conform much, but if they did, it was always to a large majority, 
as evidenced by the baseline trials. Evidently, even when confident in their own 
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judgment, those with a performance goal still find utility in referencing a social 
consensus. However, relative to those with low perceived own accuracy, those with high 
perceived own accuracy did not apply the same effortful tracking of performance.  
 Lastly, analysis of learning as a function of conformity on Block 1 revealed, as 
with Study 1, that more conformity leads to worse performance on Block 2. The one 
exception to this was with performance goal participants. Among those with low 
perceived own accuracy, those who conformed less (that is, those in the incompetent 
majority condition) did worse on Block 2 than those who conformed more (that is, those 
in the competent majority condition). As I argued earlier, perhaps conformity can be 
useful in learning after all, as suggested by the social learning literature (Lee, Dineen, 
McKendree, & Mayes, 1999). 
Study 3 
 The purpose of this study is to conceptually replicate the first pilot study using the 
one-shot paradigm employed by persuasion researchers (Mackie, 1987; Martin et al., 
2002; & Gardikiotis et al., 2005). If conformity is analogous to persuasion, then the effect 
of uncertainty (such as that in the difficult task condition of the first pilot study) should 
be similar between a conformity paradigm and a persuasion paradigm. That is, if 
participants are uncertain about their own judgment, then they may have an enhanced 
incentive to selectively accept a persuasive message by a large than small majority, as 
they may have a greater need for valid social information.  
 The studies described so far deal with motivational factors (e.g., goals) thought to 
result in heightened scrutiny of social consensus information, and thus greater selectivity 
in conformity. One factor that has been demonstrated to affect scrutiny of social 
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information (such as persuasive messages) is confidence in one's own thoughts (Petty, 
Briñol, & Tormala, 2002; Briñol & Petty, 2003). Studies on metacognition in persuasion 
and attitude change have demonstrated that individuals’ confidence in their own thoughts 
influences evaluation of a persuasive message. For instance, if a message evokes positive 
thoughts about the message (e.g., “good point!”), but the individual feels uncertain about 
the validity of his or her thoughts, then the message will be evaluated less positively than 
it would be if they were more certain. To test this, Petty et al. (2002) had participants read 
a persuasive message and write down their thoughts about it. After that, they wrote about 
five instances in which they felt either confident or doubtful about their thoughts. Finally, 
participants were asked to reflect on the thoughts they had while reading the message. 
The message itself had been either a strong or weak message—the former tends to 
provoke more message-positive thoughts and the latter tends to provoke more message-
negative thoughts. Among participants who engaged in more elaborative evaluation 
(indexed by a self-report measure of the degree to which participants felt they had 
thought about and attended to the message) of the message, doubtful participants were 
unaffected by the strength of the argument, but confident participants found the strong 
message more compelling than the weak message. Among participants who engaged in 
less elaborative evaluation, no effects were observed (although the pattern of means 
suggested that doubtful participants found the strong message more compelling than the 
weak message).  
 Suppose rather than doubting one’s thoughts about a persuasive message, an 
individual doubted their own opinions or ability to make good judgments. Such a 
condition may render an individual more susceptible to social influence than if they were 
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confident in their opinions and judgment (e.g., Chipman, 1966; Coleman, Blake, & 
Mouton, 1958; Crutchfield, 1955; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Hochbaum, 1954; Nordholm, 
1975). The results of the first pilot study suggest that doubt in one’s own judgment 
(resulting from too little time to observe the rotation stimuli) can lead to not just 
heightened conformity but heightened scrutiny of social information and selective 
conformity to large majorities. Something like this pattern was seen again with learning 
goal participants in both Study 1 and Study 2, where those rating their performance as 
low conformed more to large than small majorities. The mechanism for self-doubt was 
(presumably) the same in all three cases—that is, lack of ability to perform the task—but 
in none of these studies has there been an effort to directly manipulate individuals’ 
confidence in their own judgment.  
 Mackie (1987), Martin et al. (2002), and Gardikiotis et al. (2005) found that 
majorities could be more persuasive than minorities, but all three failed to find a specific 
effect of large majorities as more influential than small majorities. Perhaps individuals in 
those studies were generally more certain about their own attitudes going into the 
persuasive attempt. Indeed, none of those researchers attempted to manipulate confidence 
at all.  However, I have argued that people may be more concerned about the validity of 
social information when they need it – for example, when they are not particularly 
confident in their own judgments.  To test this prediction, in Study 3, I augmented the 
experimental paradigm from Martin et al. (2002) and Gardikiotis et al (2005) by 
including the confidence manipulation from Petty et al. (2002). Participants first rated 
their agreement with several controversial propositions and then wrote about a time when 
they felt certain or uncertain about their judgment. After that, participants read an article 
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advocating for one of the propositions (i.e., closing NASA).  According to the hypotheses 
outlined above, participants’ first thinking about their opinions and then thinking about 
being certain or uncertain about their own judgment should lead to differences in how 
motivated they are to scrutinize the validity of social information contained within the 
persuasive attempt. Specifically, uncertain participants should be more favorable to the 
proposition when endorsed by a large majority than by a small majority, but certain 
participants should show little or no difference in favorability to the proposition, 
regardless of what size of majority endorsed it (consistent with Mackie, 1987; Martin et 
al., 2002; & Gardikiotis et al., 2005).  
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 276 American adults recruited from the Amazon Mechanical 
Turk service, 141 of which were part of an additional pair of conditions (small and large 
minority) which were excluded from analysis due to a programing error that resulted in 
non-randomized assignment in those conditions. Additionally, five participants were 
excluded from analysis because their responses to the written part of the study were 
incoherent, suggesting that they did not take the study seriously. Seventeen of the 
remaining participants failed the manipulation check, leaving 113 participants in the 
analysis.  
Procedure and Materials 
All materials were presented to participants over the internet using Qualtrics 
survey software. The consent procedure was similar to Study 1 and Study 2. 
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After the consent process, participants rated on a scale of 1 (“Do not agree at all”) 
to 9 (“Agree completely”) their agreement with five controversial propositions (see Table 
3), including “NASA’s usefulness as an American institution has passed, and so it should 
be shut down.” This issue was selected because in a pilot study asking participants to rate 
their agreement with several controversial propositions, the proposition to close NASA 
was rated as highly disagreeable (N = 52, M = 2.47/9.00, SD = 1.91) but neutral in terms 
of personal relevance (M = 5.69/9.00, SD = 2.49) and high in terms of relevance to 
Americans (M = 6.71/9.00, SD = 1.71; see Table 4 for the full list of propositions and 
ratings). Next, participants wrote about five instances in which they felt uncertain 
(uncertain condition) or certain (certain condition) about their own judgment, or they 
wrote nothing at all and continued to the next part of the study (control condition). After 
that, participants read an article written by myself and my collaborators arguing in favor 
of closing NASA (see Appendix B), which began with the headline “82% of Americans 
Agree: NASA Should Be Closed” in the large majority condition and the same headline 
with “52%” in the small majority condition. The arguments were intended to be strong 
arguments, eliciting a more positive response to the argument itself (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1979), leaving only the percentage endorsement by Americans as a cue to message 
validity. 
 After reading the message, participants rated on a scale of 1 to 9 whether they 
thought closing NASA was bad/good, foolish/wise, harmful/beneficial, 
ineffective/effective, whether they were unfavorable/favorable, and 
convinced/unconvinced by the proposition. For each participant, scores from the six 
scales were combined (α = .94) to create a single post-message score. Following the 
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ratings, participants listed their thoughts about the proposal and then were asked to reflect 
on their thoughts and rate on a scale of 1 (“Not at all”) to 9 (“Extremely”) how confident, 
valid, secure, and certain they were. Scores from these four scales were combined to 
create a single confidence score for each participant (α = .95). After the thought listing 
and ratings, participants completed the collective (American) identity scale (this time on 
a 9-point scale; α = .93). Finally, as a manipulation check they were asked to indicate 
what percentage (on a discrete scale: 0%, 10%, 20%, … ,100%) of Americans the article 
had suggested endorsed the proposition to close NASA.  
Results 
Manipulation Check 
 Participants’ answers to the final question (percentage of Americans endorsing the 
proposition) were examined for accuracy. Those in the large majority condition who 
selected values less than 80% (N = 12) and those in the small majority condition who 
selected values greater than 60% (N = 4) or less than 50% (N = 1) were removed from 
analysis. 
Persuasion 
 The first analysis compared pre-message attitude ratings to post-message attitude 
ratings to see if a systematic shift toward or away from the proposition was evident as a 
function of certainty and majority size conditions. Pre- and post-message ratings were 
highly correlated (r(111) = .642, p < .001). Furthermore, the difference between post- and 
pre-message ratings was significantly greater than 0 (Mpost-pre = 1.49, t(112) = 8.513, p < 
.001). Together, these analyses suggest that while a general increase in ratings was 
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evident overall, the general pattern of attitudes remained the same (i.e., people who were 
initially opposed remained relatively opposed, etc.).  
 Difference scores (post-message rating – pre-message rating) were submitted to a 
2 (Majority size: small vs. large) x 2 (Certainty: uncertain vs. certain) general linear 
model (GLM) analysis in order to test the main hypotheses. Namely, participants in the 
uncertainty condition should be more persuaded by a large than small majority 
(evidenced by a larger difference score in the large majority condition than in the small 
majority condition), but no difference in persuasion should be evident among participants 
in the certainty condition (a two-way interaction between majority size and certainty). 
Analyses reveal no significant main effects of either variable (majority size: F(1,107) = 
0.12, p = .728; certainty: F(2,107) = 0.47, p = .629), and no significant interaction 
(F(2,107) = 1.57, p = .213). Thus, the results of this analysis do not support the 
hypotheses.  
 Given that the pre- and post-message ratings were different types of scales (i.e., 
one was a single-shot attitude measure and the other was an aggregate measure), the 
validity of the previous analysis may be questionable. Thus, I conducted an additional 
GLM analysis with majority size and certainty predicting just the post-message ratings. 
However, as with the difference scores, there were no significant main effects (majority 
size: F(1,107) = 0.09, p = .771; certainty: F(2,107) = 1.27, p = .285) or an interaction 
(F(2,107) = 0.97, p = .381).  
Collective (American) Identity 
Collective identity scores were submitted to a GLM analysis with goal and 
majority competence predicting collective identity. No significant main effects or 
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interactions of the two predictor variables were obtained (majority size: F(1,107) = 0.00, 
p = .996; certainty: F(2,107) = 0.17, p = .843; interaction: F(2,107) = 0.40, p = .674). I 
also conducted an analysis with collective identity as a predictor variable. If strongly 
identified group members have greater trust in the judgment of ingroup members than 
weekly identified group members, then perhaps only strongly identified group members 
would be influenced by a majority judgment when uncertain about their own judgment. 
Furthermore, such a state of uncertainty may increase the need for valid social 
information, and thus they will be more persuaded by a large than small majority.  
I performed a GLM analysis with majority size, certainty, and collective identity 
predicting post-message ratings. Results reveal a significant two-way interaction between 
certainty and collective identity (F(1,105) = 6.47, p = .012) such that among highly 
identified participants, uncertain participants rated higher agreement with the proposition 
to close NASA than certain participants (t(101) = 2.98, p = .004) and marginally higher 
baseline participants (t(101) = 1.79, p = .076), but among low identifiers, no such 
differences were observed (see Figure 13). The predicted three-way interaction was not 
significant (F(1,105) = 0.49, p = .485). Suggesting that the uncertainty manipulation had 
some effect on persuasion among high identifiers, but majority size did not make any 
difference.  
Discussion 
 The certainty manipulation was intended to induce uncertainty in participants’ 
own judgment, which should have worked if they had been thinking about their judgment 
while undergoing the manipulation. However, perhaps simply asking participants to rate 
their agreement with several controversial propositions was not enough to induce the kind 
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of elaborative cognition necessary to induce uncertainty. Indeed, Petty et al. (2002) argue 
that elaboration is precisely what is needed for the uncertainty manipulation to induce 
uncertainty. Perhaps a better experimental paradigm would include not just ratings of 
agreement, but questions asking why participants feel the way they do and perhaps a 
ratings scale similar to that implemented by Petty et al. (Study 3, 2002) where 
participants rated the extent to which they thought about the issues as they responded. 
Another potential means for inducing uncertainty in participants’ judgment could be to 
have them answer questions about the facts of an issue and then provide false feedback 
about the accuracy of their knowledge.  
Given the results of the analysis with collective identity, it could be that the 
certainty manipulation was successful, but the effect of the manipulation is only apparent 
among high identifiers. Furthermore, it appears that majority size does not make a 
difference among high identifying uncertain individuals. This result is surprising if the 
uncertainty induced in this study is analogous to the low perceived own accuracy of 
Study 2, since majority size did appear to be used both heuristically and as a means of 
assessing the validity of the majority among learning goal and performance goal 
participants respectively. One potential explanation for the discrepancy between the two 
sets of findings is that participants in this study were not interested in learning, and the 
results seen by performance goal participants in Study 2 require multiple trials. 
General Discussion 
 The three studies described above were designed to investigate some of the 
motivational factors leading to the use of majority size as a cue to the validity of social 
information. Of particular interest was whether a heightened need for valid social 
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information would lead to an assessment of the majority’s validity using the correlation 
between majority size and performance over time.  
 The results of the three studies do not straightforwardly support the hypotheses 
originally proposed. In Study 1, I predicted that performance goal participants would 
conform more to a competent than an incompetent majority, whereas learning goal 
participants would display little conformity and show no difference in conformity as a 
function of group competence. This prediction was not supported by the data. Instead, 
there was a general pattern across goal conditions of conformity similar to that seen in the 
second pilot study. If anything, the pattern of means in the (non-significant) three-way 
interaction between goal, majority competence, and piechart correctness suggested the 
opposite of what had been predicted—learning goal participants appeared to have a 
preference for the competent majority but performance goal participants did not. 
Corresponding predictions were proposed for Study 2, but once again, only a general 
preference for the competent majority over the incompetent majority was identified. 
Study 3 predicted greater persuasive influence by a large than small majority for 
uncertain but not certain participants, but no effect of size or certainty much less an 
interaction between the two was attained. Taken alone, these results appear to suggest 
one of two possibilities. The first possibility is that the goal and uncertainty 
manipulations were unsuccessful. The second possibility is that the proposed 
motivational mechanisms simply do not result in the predicted patterns of conformity and 
persuasion. However, follow-up analyses suggest that the first possibility is unlikely, and 
the second possibility is only partially correct. 
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 The first two studies included a question at the end asking how accurate 
participants felt their performance was. Including participants’ answers to that question as 
a predictor revealed some interesting if complicated results. The key predictions revolved 
around conformity with a performance goal. However, performance goal participants in 
Study 1 did not appear to conform very much at all, whether they perceived their 
accuracy to be low or high. On the other hand, the predicted preference for a competent 
majority was seen clearly in Study 2 among those low in perceived own accuracy. At 
least three explanations are possible. First, the incentive to perform was higher in Study 
1, as participants were being paid for performance on each trial. Perhaps this incentive 
made conformity to either majority seem too risky. Second, the piecharts were presented 
for several seconds longer on Study1 than on Study 2. Perhaps this additional time to 
think about the rotation stimuli and the majority’s response was enough to cause doubts. 
Third, the prime employed in Study 2 contained words such as “triumph” and “victory” 
which might have induced a competitive type of performance goal, which might have 
eliminated any normative pressure to conform, rendering the majority merely a tool that 
was easy to discard when judged to be an invalid source of information. 
In contrast to the performance goal conditions, among those with low perceived 
own accuracy, learning goal participants in Study 1 produced a large discrepancy 
between correct and incorrect piechart trials, suggesting conformity. Furthermore, among 
those with low perceived own accuracy, learning goal participants had much worse 
performance with the incompetent majority than with the competent majority. I suggested 
that the difference in performance between majority competence conditions was due to 
conformity strictly to large majorities. Results from Study 2 confirmed this hypothesis. 
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Indeed, baseline trials were not significantly different from performance on trials with a 
small majority, but significantly greater or worse on trials with a large majority 
depending on whether the majority was correct or incorrect respectively. Among those 
high in perceived own accuracy, learning goal participants showed very little if any 
conformity at all in either study. These results were surprising given my initial 
hypotheses. Apparently, I underestimated the extent to which individuals will be 
motivated to rely on others for help while learning. Interestingly, the pattern of 
conformity evident among those with low perceived own accuracy suggests that even if 
they did not scrutinize the majority for validity per se, they did apply a stricter standard 
for conformity than just majority status, as had also been evident in the first pilot study.  
One question arising from the results of learning goal participants with low 
perceived own accuracy is whether the goal that had been pursued was indeed a learning 
goal at all. Perhaps only the performance goal conditions induced enough motivation to 
perform that participants were willing to disregard social information in favor of their 
own judgment (Study 1, both competence conditions; Study 2, incompetent majority 
condition). It is possible that participants in learning goal conditions were motivated by a 
more communal attitude toward their group. However, if this explanation were correct, 
then the dynamics of the learning goal condition in Study 2 should have been identical to 
the affiliation goal condition, but this was not the case. Learning goal participants appear 
to prefer only large majorities, whereas affiliation goal participants apparently do not. 
Another possibility is that participants in the learning goal condition were not motivated 
by any particular goal other than to complete the task quickly, and thus the observed 
conformity can be thought of as simple heuristic processing. This may be true, but that 
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assessment cannot explain why learning goal participants (with low perceived own 
accuracy) only conformed to large majorities. Given that two entirely different kinds of 
manipulations were employed in Study 1 and Study 2, but similar results were observed, 
the best explanation is that the same goal (a learning goal) was induced in both studies, 
and that the demands of satisfying that goal require more valid social information than, 
for instance, satisfaction of an affiliation goal.  
In Study 2 I predicted that an affiliation goal would result in undifferentiated 
conformity to both types of majority. Results for participants with low perceived own 
accuracy supported this hypothesis, although not perfectly. Conformity was both evident 
and not significantly different between majority competence conditions. The results for 
those with high perceived own accuracy were more confusing, as one might expect 
conformity regardless of participants’ ability. One potential explanation, as I argued 
before, is that for those with more confidence in their skills, performing well on the task 
is exactly what would constitute normative behavior. The pattern of results looks similar 
to but less extreme than the low perceived own accuracy performance goal results.  
Study 3 did not implement a goal manipulation, but instead attempted to 
manipulate participants’ certainty about their own judgment. Although none of the main 
analyses supported the proposed hypotheses, analysis using American collective 
identification at least suggests that the certainty manipulation had some effect. If 
uncertainty increased the standard for evaluation at all, it was only evident with the 
identification measure. That is, those who do not identify as much with Americans did 
not see American popular opinion as being a credible source of information, and so those 
who were uncertain about their own judgment were not persuaded by the message any 
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more than controls and those who were more certain. On the other hand, those who 
identify more strongly with Americans did find American popular opinion to be credible, 
and thus they were more persuaded by it when uncertain.  
Taken together, the results of these studies lead to two tentative conclusions 
regarding majority size as it pertains to conformity. First, majority size is likely to be 
most readily used in the process of tracking the performance of the group over time. The 
main analyses from both Study 1 and Study 2 support this conclusion, and the null results 
of Study 3 are at least interpretable from that perspective. Second, the utility of 
scrutinizing a social majority for validity may be most apparent among people who are 
not independently competent, as they lack the necessary skills or confidence to perform 
well on their own. One of the limitations of this research, however, is that both these 
conclusions cannot be true. That is, it seems unlikely that as a general rule people track 
performance as it correlates to majority size and that such tracking requires the extra 
motivation from individuals’ sense of incompetence in interaction with their goals.   
Another potential limitation of this research is that the first two studies were 
conducted with Lehigh University students, who may have different motivations and 
strategies for approaching challenges. Thus, the generalizability of the conclusions is 
unclear. However, the biggest difference is likely to be in students’ chronic goals, which 
are likely to be performance oriented, given the elite status of the school. This may also 
explain the seemingly contradictory conclusions of the last paragraph. That is, Lehigh 
students may generally operate with performance goals, even when motivated by other 
goals.  
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A final limitation to conclusions regarding the results of Study 1 and Study 2 is 
that they resulted from participants with low perceived own accuracy. Participants with 
low perceived own accuracy performed objectively worse than those with high perceived 
own accuracy. Furthermore, their lower scores on the perceived own accuracy measure 
suggest that they had less confidence in their own performance across the board. One 
problem that arises from this is that it is difficult to determine whether those participants 
could indeed track the performance of the group over time if they were rarely confident 
in their own answers. In order to track the competence of the group over time, they would 
have to have some subjective sense that their answers are correct, and those answers 
must, in fact, be correct. If neither of those conditions were met, then the interpretability 
of those results becomes questionable. However, note that in both studies, average 
perceived own accuracy was around 4 out of 6, and the standard deviation was around 1. 
Furthermore, averaged across other variables, accuracy among participants with low 
participants was around 75% (on average) in Study 1 and around 69% (on average) in 
Study 2. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that even participants with low perceived own 
accuracy were accurate and potentially confident enough in their own performance to be 
able to track the performance of the group over time. 
 To conclude, the results of this research provide tentative evidence that when 
people are unsure of their own judgment, they will be more likely to use social 
information and to evaluate it for validity. Depending on what type of goal individuals 
are pursuing, the evaluation of social information may be more or less critical. For 
instance, performance goals are best satisfied when individuals have access to valid 
information, and so the pursuit of performance goals induces a more critical assessment 
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of the information. Learning goals, however, do not require the continuous success that a 
performance goal might, and in fact may benefit from failure (at least if feedback is 
available), and so individuals have less of a need for validity (see Elliott & Dweck, 1988 
for a discussion on the dynamics performance and learning goals). The results of this 
research also suggest that the dynamics of conformity may be entirely different for 
people with more confidence in their judgment. Social information may not be seen as 
useful or as being valid, inspiring a greater sense of independence from the group. 
Overall, this research provides a first step for discovering the particular means by which 
individuals with different motives and goals scrutinize social information with cues such 
as majority size.  
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Footnotes 
1
 I say “elaborate” here because the rankings only shifted from low to mid-range, 
suggesting that participants expanded their understanding of “politician” rather than 
replaced it entirely. 
2
 One figured out the pattern between correctness of the piecharts and size of the 
majority, while the other figured out that the study was using a variant of the Asch 
paradigm.  
3
 One walked out in the middle of the session to give keys to a friend. The other 
indicated a hurry to get to class before starting and took a fairly short time to complete 
the task. 
4
 I should note that goal is only a significant predictor when discrepancy is 
included in the model. A model with goal and majority competence predicting Block 2 
accuracy contains no main effects or interactions.  
5
 On the other hand, it could well be that performance goal participants were less 
motivated during Block 2, as they had already earned money. 
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Table 1. Study 2 - These words were presented in random order to participants who then 
grouped them by meaning in as many groups as they felt necessary up to six. Words are 
grouped below with respect to the type of goal thought beforehand to be associated.  
  
Goal 
 
  Affiliation 
 
Learning 
 
Performance 
bond 
 
learn 
 
perform 
affiliate 
 
master 
 
triumph 
comradery 
 
train 
 
overcome 
friend 
 
prepare 
 
succeed 
partner 
 
study 
 
attain 
together 
 
improve 
 
victory 
trust 
 
refine 
 
champion 
embrace 
 
advance 
 
conquer 
team 
 
progress 
 
dominate 
ally 
 
develop 
 
prevail 
support 
 
expert 
 
beat 
care 
   
ability 
    
prize 
    
reward 
    
score 
    
award 
    
trophy 
    
capable 
    
bonus 
    
goal 
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Table 2. Study 2 - Comparisons of correct, incorrect, and baseline trials by perceived own 
accuracy, goal, and majority competence.  
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Figure 1. Study 1 - Order of presentation for practice trials in Study 1. First, a fixation 
cross was presented for 500ms. Next, the rotation stimuli were presented for 6000ms. 
Finally, the cue to respond (Press “1” if same, Press “2” if different).  
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Figure 2. Study 1 - Order of presentation for Block 1 trials. First, a fixation cross was 
presented for 500ms. Next, the rotation stimuli were presented for 6000ms. Next, a 
piechart was presented indicating the ostensible percentage of Lehigh students who 
thought the stimuli were the same and different. Finally, the cue to respond (Press “1” if 
same, Press “2” if different).  
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Figure 3. Study 1 - Percent correct as a function of majority competence and piechart 
correctness in Block 1. The difference between correct and incorrect trials is greater for 
participants in the competent than incompetent majority condition. 
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Figure 4. Study 1 - Percent correct as a function of majority competence and piechart 
correctness for each goal condition in Block 1. The difference between correct and 
incorrect trials was greater for participants in the competent majority condition than for 
those in the incompetent majority condition in the learning goal condition, but no such 
difference of differences was evident in the performance goal condition.  
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Figure 5. Study 1 - Percent correct as a function of goal, piechart correctness, and 
perceived own accuracy. Greater conformity is evident with learning goal than 
performance goal participants only among those scoring low on perceived own accuracy.  
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Figure 6. Study 1 - Percent correct during Block 1 as a function of goal, majority 
competence, and perceived own accuracy. Among those scoring low on perceived own 
accuracy, performance is greater with a competent than incompetent majority, but no 
such difference is evident among those scoring high in perceived own accuracy.  
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Figure 7. Study 2 - Goal-related words mapped onto a two-dimensional plane. Three 
primary groups of words are apparent in this plot. Words central to the groups were 
selected for the word search puzzles (affiliation: together, affiliate, friend, partner, ally, 
team, bond, comradery; learning: learn, advance, refine, improve, develop, study, 
progress, train; performance: beat, prize, overcome, prevail, succeed, triumph, trophy, 
victory).  
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Figure 8. Study 2 - Percent correct as a function of majority competence and piechart 
correctness on Block 1. The difference between correct and incorrect piechart trials is 
greater in the competent than incompetent majority condition. 
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Figure 9. Study 2 - Percent correct as a function of perceived own accuracy and piechart 
correctness on Block 1. Participants with low perceived own accuracy conformed more 
than participants with high perceived own accuracy. 
  
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
75 
80 
85 
90 
95 
100 
Low High 
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
C
o
rr
e
ct
 
Block 1 
Perceived Own Accuracy x Piechart Correctness 
Incorrect 
Correct 
No Info 
 92 
Figure 10. Study 2 - Percent correct as a function of perceived own accuracy, goal, 
majority competence and piechart correctness on Block 1.  
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Figure 11. Study 2 - Percent correct as a function of goal and majority competence on 
Block 2. Performance goal participants in the incompetent majority condition performed 
worse on Block 2 than those in the competent majority condition.  
 
  
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
75 
80 
85 
90 
95 
100 
Incompetent Competent 
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
C
o
rr
e
ct
 
Block 2 
Goal x Majority Competence 
Affiliation 
Learning 
Performance 
 94 
Figure 12. Study 2 - Percent correct on Block 2 as a function of conformity (discrepancy 
between correct and incorrect piechart trials during Block 1), goal, and majority 
competence. Performance goal participants who conformed less (those in the incompetent 
majority condition) performed worse during Block 2 than those who conformed more.  
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Figure 13. Study 3 - Post-message rating as a function of certainty and collective 
identification. Among high identifiers, uncertain participants rated higher agreement than 
certain and control participants, but no differences were evident among low identifiers. 
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Appendix A 
IMPRESSIONS OF ROTATION TASK (STUDIES 1 & 2) 
 
How accurate do you think your own responses have been in the mental rotation task so 
far? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very inaccurate   Very accurate 
 
How accurate do you think the responses of your group have been so far? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very inaccurate   Very accurate 
 
Please rate the frequency with which you did the following things throughout the task so 
far. 
 
- What percentage of the time did you give the same answer as the majority of other 
players because you were sure you had the right answer and that the majority was 
also right? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
- What percentage of the time did you give the same answer as the majority of other 
players because you were unsure about the right answer and decided to go with the 
majority response? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
- What percentage of the time did you give the same answers as the majority of other 
players even though you were sure they were wrong? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
- What percentage of the time did you give a different answer to the majority of other 
players because you were sure they were wrong? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
- What percentage of the time did you give a different answer to the majority of other 
players even though you were not sure what the right answer was? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
- What percentage of the time did you give a different answer to the majority of other 
players even though you were sure they were right? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
Do you have any comments about this study? (Open response) 
Do you have any comments regarding the [social stimuli]? (Open response) 
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COLLECTIVE IDENTIFICATION (ALL STUDIES) 
- I feel a bond with [group] 
- I feel solidarity with [group] 
- I feel committed to [group] 
- I am glad to be in [group] 
- I think that [group] has a lot to be proud of 
- It is pleasant to be [group] 
- Being [group] gives me a good feeling 
- I often think about the fact that I am [group] 
- The fact that I am [group] is an important part of my identity 
- Being [group] is an important part of how I see myself 
- I have a lot in common with the average [group] member 
- I am similar to the average [group] member 
- [Group] members have a lot in common with one another 
- [Group] members are very similar to each other 
- I identify with other [group] people 
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Appendix B 
82% of Americans Agree: NASA Should Be Closed 
In a recent poll, 82% of Americans agreed that NASA’s usefulness as an 
institution has run its course, and the time has come for NASA to be closed. NASA’s 
symbolic relevance to Americans faded with the end of the space shuttle program, and 
their large tax-supported budget would be better spent elsewhere. 
NASA’s once-great space shuttle program ended in 2011. This program provided 
several generations of Americans an opportunity to achieve one of the ultimate dream 
jobs: to be an astronaut! But now that the shuttle program has been retired, Americans 
interested in visiting space will have to turn elsewhere. What went wrong? As with many 
public projects, governmental micromanaging and bureaucratic bloat have weighed 
NASA’s programs down and led to its gradual decline. Many projects over the years have 
been abandoned due to spiraling costs and bureaucratic inefficiency. 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether we, as a society, can afford a public space 
program. Nearly 18 billion dollars are spent on the space program every year. This is 
money that could be used to educate and train millions of people for the high-tech jobs of 
America’s future. Employers already desperately seek qualified workers. Among those 
employers are private aeronautics companies, which are developing technologies that will 
allow America to remain at the forefront of space exploration. Private aeronautics 
companies are the future of space science and travel.  NASA’s enormous budget should 
be redirected to other things, including much-needed training and investment in the 
commercial aeronautics industry. 
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